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THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL 
William Ewald* 
I. INTRODUCTION 
A. THE PROBLEM OF MADISON’S NOTES 
The principal source for our knowledge of the drafting of 
the Constitution is James Madison’s Notes of the debates in the 
Philadelphia Convention of 1787.1 Other delegates—Robert 
Yates, Rufus King, James McHenry, Alexander Hamilton—
from time to time kept a sketchy diary; and there is also the 
official, but remarkably uninformative, Journal, which is little 
more than a calendar of resolutions and votes. Madison stands 
apart. He left behind a careful record, rich in anecdotal detail, of 
each day’s proceedings, from the first straggling arrival of the 
delegates in Philadelphia until the concluding ceremonies four 
months later. 
It is primarily to the Notes that we owe our knowledge of 
the dramatic events, both human and intellectual, of that 
summer: the silent but powerful presence of Washington in the 
president’s chair; Edmund Randolph’s presentation on May 29 
of the Virginia Plan; the initial testing of the waters as late-
 
 * Professor of Law and Philosophy, University of Pennsylvania. This work forms 
a chapter in a forthcoming intellectual biography of James Wilson, and develops ideas 
first broached in Ewald, infra note 42; that article provides additional background and 
context, especially about Wilson’s wider role at the Convention. I am grateful to many 
friends and colleagues for their comments: Greg Ablavsky, Matt Adler, Lee Arnold, 
Randy Barnett, Richard Beeman, Mary Bilder, Steve Burbank, Martin Clagett, Tamara 
Gaskell, Frank Goodman, Sally Gordon, Calvin Johnson, Pauline Maier, Bruce Mann, 
Maeva Marcus, John Mikhail, Bill Nelson, Peter Onuf, Nick Pedersen, Jim Pfander, 
Taylor Reveley, Kim Roosevelt, Ted Ruger, Justin Simard, Cathie Struve, Lorianne 
Updike Toler, Jim Whitman, Dean Williams, and Mike Zuckerman. I am also grateful to 
audiences at the University of Pennsylvania, the University of Virginia, the McNeil 
Center for Early American Studies, the American Society for Legal History, and the 
Zuckerman Salon. 
 1. Madison did not himself give a title to his manuscript notes from the 1787 
Convention; they were first published four years after his death in THE PAPERS OF 
JAMES MADISON (H. D. Gilpin ed., 1840). Gilpin gave them the heading, “Debates in the 
Federal Convention.” In conformity with standard usage, I refer to them as Madison’s 
Notes.  
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comers continued to arrive; the first skirmishes in early June 
between the delegates from the small states and those from the 
large; Franklin’s efforts to cool tempers; then, on June 15, the 
submission, on behalf of the small states, of the New Jersey plan. 
This submission was followed by more than a month of increas-
ingly acrimonious debate that brought proceedings to a standstill 
and threatened to derail the Convention altogether. The argu-
ments of the “great debate” were punctuated by the inebriated 
discourse of Luther Martin and the day-long speech of 
Hamilton. Then, finally, on July 16, the controversy was resolved 
by the adoption of the “Connecticut Compromise.” After July 16 
the mood seems to have lightened, and the delegates turned 
their attention to less contentious matters. The Convention 
adjourned for ten days to let the Committee of Detail arrange 
the work that had so far been accomplished and resumed 
business on August 6. But this period of relative calm was to be 
interrupted once more in the middle of August as the delegates 
clashed again, this time primarily over the issue of the slave 
trade. A second, less honorable, compromise was reached. Then 
came the final negotiations, the polishing of the text by 
Gouverneur Morris, the signing ceremony on September 17, and 
the extraordinary concluding speech by Benjamin Franklin. 
Without Madison we would know little of these episodes: 
and the Notes form the backbone of the standard scholarly 
reference, Max Farrand’s Records of the Federal Convention of 
1787.2 Remarkably, Madison recorded his Notes while he was 
himself serving as one of the most active members of the 
Convention—regularly proposing motions, making arguments, 
answering objections. As Jefferson wrote to John Adams in 
1815, “Do you know that there exists in manuscript the ablest 
work of this kind ever yet executed, of the debates of the 
constitutional convention of Philadelphia in 1788 [sic]? The 
whole of every thing said and done there was taken down by Mr. 
Madison, with a labor and exactness beyond comprehension.”3 
 
 2. THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 1787 (Max Farrand ed., 
1911) [hereinafter CONVENTION RECORDS]. Farrand’s original three-volume work was 
re-issued in 1937; by that time, he had discovered enough further documentation to fill a 
fourth volume. In 1987, James H. Hutson took the somewhat disorganized materials in 
Farrand’s fourth volume and combined them with newly-discovered materials into his 
SUPPLEMENT TO MAX FARRAND’S THE RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION OF 
1787 (James H. Hutson ed., 1987) [hereinafter SUPPLEMENT]. Farrand’s first three 
volumes were re-issued at that time; so the current edition consists of the first three 
volumes and the Hutson SUPPLEMENT. The earlier volume four is now superseded. 
 3. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 421 (letter of Jefferson to Adams of 
August 10, 1815). 
!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2012 2:08 PM 
2012] THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL 199 
 
Jefferson’s admiration is fully justified. Nevertheless, as 
historians have long recognized, the Notes have serious 
limitations. In the first place, they are incomplete. They do not 
record the inner workings of the Convention’s various subcom-
mittees, even if Madison was a member. They scarcely mention 
the (no doubt incessant) discussions and bargaining that took 
place out of doors. Even as a record of what was said on the 
floor of the State House they are manifestly deficient. The 
Convention met for at least five hours a day, and frequently 
longer.4 But a typical entry in the Notes can easily be read aloud 
in ten minutes. The Notes, in other words, are not a transcription 
of what the delegates said, but something quite different. They 
are, inevitably, a summary of what Madison understood the 
delegates to have said, and, beyond that, of what he judged 
sufficiently important to record. These facts are often 
overlooked; and writers who parse the speeches in the Notes as 
though they are direct quotations are making an elementary 
error. 
Because of these limitations, historians of the Convention 
have labored to fill in the background, to get behind Madison’s 
record of events; and a comparison of Farrand’s influential 
monograph (published in 1913, and still in print) with Richard 
Beeman’s comprehensive treatment a century later will show the 
progress that has been made.5 About the general background—
about the biographies of the delegates, about the social and 
economic setting, about politics and ideology, about the place of 
the Convention in American history—we know incomparably 
more. But the study of the primary texts of the Convention has 
languished and has remained more or less where Farrand and 
Jameson left it a century ago.6 
 
 4. Washington recorded in his diary that the Convention met “not less than five, 
for a large part of the time six, and sometimes 7 hours sitting every day.” 3 CONVENTION 
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 81. Strictly speaking, most of these meetings were meetings of 
the Committee of the Whole, which was entitled to follow more flexible parliamentary 
rules than the Convention. In order to avoid confusing the Committee of the Whole with 
the Committee of Detail, I shall speak of “the Convention” throughout.   
 5. MAX FARRAND, THE FRAMING OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES (1913); RICHARD BEEMAN, PLAIN, HONEST MEN: THE MAKING OF THE 
AMERICAN CONSTITUTION (2009). 
 6. The primary texts reporting the work of the Convention itself, especially 
Madison’s Notes, were printed in Farrand’s first two volumes; those two volumes have 
not been altered since the edition of 1911. CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2. The 
same is true for the background materials Farrand collected in his volume three. The new 
material discovered since 1911 (much of it found by Farrand) is background information 
in the form of letters, family anecdotes, and the like, almost all of it postdating the 
Convention; these materials appear in the 1987 Hutson SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2. 
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But there is a further and more subterranean problem. The 
Notes are far too polished to have been written as the speeches 
themselves were being delivered on the floor. Madison says that 
he jotted down notes, now lost, which he worked up later into 
the version we possess today. His own account emphasizes that 
the working-up occurred immediately: “losing not a moment 
unnecessarily between the adjournment and reassembling of the 
Convention I was enabled to write out my daily notes during the 
session or within a few finishing days after its close.”7 But 
Farrand pointed out that Madison sometime after 1819 altered 
his Notes to bring them into conformity with the published 
Journal, and there has long been a question about the extent and 
the timing of the revisions.8 
This issue was raised in the early 1950s by William Crosskey 
of the University of Chicago. Crosskey charged—explicitly in his 
classes, somewhat more circumspectly in print—that Madison 
had engaged, years later, in a wholesale re-writing of his Notes, 
and that the intent was to burnish his political reputation. In 
other words, James Madison was “a forger.”9 Crosskey did not 
present persuasive evidence for his claims, which were widely 
dismissed; and in 1986 James Hutson concluded from a close 
examination of the original Madison manuscripts that the 
charges were baseless.10 
There, for a time, matters rested. But recently Mary Bilder, 
using new techniques of documentary analysis, has re-opened 
the question. Her forthcoming book examines the question of 
the Madison manuscript in detail, although she stops well short 
of Crosskey’s more extreme claims.11 The issues here go well 
beyond Madison. They raise the fundamental question, rarely 
discussed in the legal literature, of the reliability of the docu-
mentary evidence: of its accuracy, of its completeness, and of its 
 
 7. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at xvi.  
 8. Farrand discusses the alterations to the Madison manuscript in 1 CONVENTION 
RECORDS, supra note 2, at xv–xix. The changes that Farrand discusses were principally to 
bring his tallies of votes into line with the published Journal. But Madison also made 
about fifty insertions from the published notes of Yates—this even though he knew them 
to be unreliable. 
 9. The Crosskey charges are discussed in SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at xx–xxv. 
See generally WILLIAM WINSLOW CROSSKEY, POLITICS AND THE CONSTITUTION IN THE 
HISTORY OF THE UNITED STATES (1953). 
 10. James H. Hutson, The Creation of the Constitution: The Integrity of the 
Documentary Record, 65 TEX. L. REV. 1, 9–12 (1986). 
 11. MARY SARAH BILDER, MADISON’S HAND: REVISING THE CONSTITUTIONAL 
CONVENTION (forthcoming). The possibility of a subsequent re-writing has also been 
raised on independent grounds by BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 85, 98. 
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integrity. Put bluntly: How much confidence are we entitled to 
place in any purported reconstruction of the events of 1787? 
How much do we know—how much indeed can we know—
about the making of the Constitution? 
B. THE PROBLEM OF THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL 
I wish here to focus on one neglected aspect of this problem. 
Madison’s Notes contain a lengthy gap, encompassing ten days at 
the end of July and the beginning of August. During this time 
the Convention stood adjourned while the Committee of Detail 
re-worked the miscellaneous Convention resolutions into a 
single document. The gap itself is well known; but its 
significance, in my view, has been underestimated. The 
Committee is typically treated in a page or two, as an interlude 
between the more dramatic events on either side. My first claim 
is that this widespread view is a mistake. This ten-day gap in 
Madison’s Notes was arguably the most creative period of 
constitutional drafting of the entire summer. Certainly, day for 
day, it was the most intensive. Far from being a mere interlude, 
at least in certain respects, and for certain fundamental issues, it 
was the main event. 
But the deeper interest of this example lies elsewhere. It 
raises acute questions of evidence: first, and most obviously, 
about the physical documents, about their completeness and 
reliability. But it raises as well another and subtler set of 
questions—not now about the reliability of the documents, but 
about the way those documents have been handled and 
understood by subsequent scholarship. Briefly: How could the 
full significance of the Committee of Detail have been 
overlooked? A detailed historiography of the Committee lies 
beyond the scope of this article, and I shall postpone it to 
another occasion. But a great deal turns on the history of the 
documents themselves—on the gaps in Madison’s Notes, and on 
the fact that the Committee documents came to light in a 
haphazard fashion. It is important to remember, as one examines 
Farrand’s polished volumes, that the materials he so carefully 
assembled were not always available. They came to light at 
different times; their availability to scholars, or their absence, 
had an effect on historical interpretation; and a particular 
interpretation, once established, can take on a life of its own. 
Farrand was confronted with an untidy mass of papers, widely 
scattered. He was forced, as any scholar in such a situation 
would be forced, to make editorial choices—choices about what 
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to include, where to place it, what to emphasize. Of necessity, his 
choices were guided by his own understanding of the events of 
the Convention; and those choices in turn have guided the 
direction of subsequent research. Even the polish of the volumes 
can be deceptive: words on the printed page make a different 
impression than a hasty scrawl on a scrap of paper in the 
archives. The Committee of Detail offers a striking illustration of 
these points, and of the way in which the seemingly mundane 
details of archival research and textual editing can influence our 
understanding of the drafting of the Constitution. 
But let us now turn our attention to the Committee itself. 
 1. Formation of the Committee of Detail 
The Committee came about as follows. The delegates to the 
Convention, after the climacteric vote of July 16, were 
exhausted. They had been in session, six days a week, for nearly 
two months, and had spent more than half that time in 
acrimonious deadlock. Only the bare outline of a Constitution 
had so far been settled, and the delegates were in ill temper. It 
was evident that a great deal of work still lay ahead. In addition, 
the weather in late July had grown “very warme,”12 and many 
delegates had business or family to attend to. It was time for a 
break. Elbridge Gerry on Tuesday, July 24, moved the 
appointment of a committee to draw up a Constitution 
“conformable to the Resolutions passed by the Convention.”13 
Ominously, immediately before the vote, General Pinckney of 
South Carolina “reminded the Convention that if the Committee 
should fail to insert some security to the Southern States agst. an 
emancipation of slaves, and taxes on exports, he shd. be bound 
by duty to his State to vote agst. their Report.”14 The Convention 
then voted unanimously to appoint a five-member Committee, 
which they informally referred to as the “Committee of Detail” 
or “the Committee of Five.” 
The Committee members were selected at the close of busi-
ness the following day. They were evidently chosen with an eye 
to geographical balance: Nathaniel Gorham (Massachusetts); 
Oliver Ellsworth (Connecticut); James Wilson (Pennsylvania); 
Edmund Randolph (Virginia); John Rutledge (South Carolina). 
 
 12. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 332. 
 13. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 85–87, 95–97; the language quoted is 
at 106.  
 14. Id. at 95. 
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Madison (for reasons I shall discuss later) was not selected. Four 
of the five were eminent lawyers. Randolph was later to serve as 
Washington’s Attorney General. Wilson, Ellsworth, and 
Rutledge all were appointed by Washington to sit on the 
Supreme Court; Rutledge and Ellsworth both briefly served as 
Chief Justice. (Gorham, the odd man out, was a businessman.) 
Also on Tuesday it was decided to refer to the Committee, in 
addition to the Convention resolutions, the New Jersey plan and 
the plan submitted to the Convention by Charles Pinckney on 
May 29, which apparently had not been heard of since he 
introduced it. 
There is no suggestion, in any of the surviving scraps of 
evidence, that the Committee was to have carte blanche. The 
expectation appears to have been (as Washington noted in his 
diary) that the Committee would “arrange, and draw into 
method & form the several matters which had been agreed to by 
the Convention, as a Constitution for the United States.”15 The 
Convention continued to meet through Thursday, July 26, at 
which point it voted to adjourn for ten days. That would give the 
Committee time to prepare its Report. The other delegates 
would have a break. The adjournment and the appointment of 
the Committee were reported in the local papers.16 The 
Committee met; it prepared a draft of a Constitution, which was 
secretly printed for distribution to the delegates; this printed 
Report served as the basis for the Convention’s deliberations in 
August and September. Madison’s Notes cease on July 26; he 
resumes the narrative with the submission of the Committee’s 
Report to the full Convention on Monday, August 6. About the 
internal workings of the Committee he says nothing. 
 2. History of the Documents 
The Constitutional Convention closed its doors on 
September 17. As its last official act before the signing, it 
ordered that the official Journal (kept by the Secretary, William 
Jackson) be turned over to George Washington; the rule of 
secrecy would remain in vigor.17 Later that day, Jackson wrote to 
 
 15. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 65 (diary entry for July 27). For 
further scraps, see infra, note 50 and accompanying text. 
 16. THE PHILADELPHIA PACKET AND DAILY ADVERTISER, July 30, 1787, at 3. The 
importance of this rare lapse from the rule of secrecy should not be exaggerated. There 
was little choice: otherwise, how to explain to an anxious public the sudden appearance 
during the day of so many delegates on the streets of Philadelphia? 
 17. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 648. 
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Washington that “Major Jackson, after burning all the loose 
scraps of paper which belong to the Convention, will this 
evening wait upon the General with the Journals and other 
papers which their vote directs to be delivered to His 
Excellency.”18 
In the years that followed, the rule of secrecy surrounding 
the Convention was strictly observed. There is the odd scrap 
here and there—a remark in private correspondence, or a family 
anecdote—but in essence the public knew nothing whatsoever 
about the internal debates of 1787. Nor was it much enlightened 
when, in 1819, Congress authorized the publication of the 
Journal, which turned out to be little more than a list of motions 
and of votes recorded by state. It gives almost no information 
about the debates or about the contributions of the individual 
delegates. 
The great change came in 1840, when Madison’s Notes were 
published. Now, fifty-three years after the Convention, after the 
last of the delegates had died, the public finally (it seemed) had a 
reliable record of events inside the Convention—a contemp-
oraneous record, made with remarkable industry by the revered 
late President. 
Over the next four decades the documentary situation did 
not greatly change. The story of the Convention told in the Notes 
(and then powerfully reinforced by George Bancroft’s 
magisterial History of the Formation of the Constitution19) 
dominated the historical understanding. Meanwhile, letters and 
diaries, such as they were, passed from children to grand-
children; some ended in the historical archives that were just 
then being established. One such set of papers was given in 1876 
to the Historical Society of Pennsylvania (“HSP”) by Emily 
Hollingsworth of Philadelphia, the granddaughter of James 
Wilson. How they came to their present location is a story worth 
telling, if only as a reminder of the precariousness of the 
evidence.20 
 
 18. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 82. 
 19. GEORGE BANCROFT, HISTORY OF THE FORMATION OF THE CONSTITUTION OF 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (1882). 
 20. The discussion that follows is based on an inspection of the documents at the 
HSP; the correspondence between the director of the HSP and Hollingsworth is located 
in volume two of the Wilson archive. The original documents for the Committee of 
Detail are photographically reproduced, with a facing-page transcription, in William 
Ewald & Lorianne Updike Toler, Early Drafts of the U.S. Constitution, 135 PA. MAG. OF 
HIST. AND BIOG. 227 (2011) [hereinafter COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS]. Updike Toler’s 
Addendum to that article discusses the history of the Wilson documents (including 
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Wilson died a bankrupt in 1798. His library and many of his 
possessions were sold to pay his creditors. His private papers 
passed to his son, Bird Wilson (himself a lawyer and later a 
distinguished clergyman). Bird used a selection of the papers to 
prepare an edition of his father’s Works, which appeared in 1804. 
There is no evidence that Bird was aware that he had in his 
possession early drafts of the Constitution. This is not altogether 
surprising. Because of the strict rule of secrecy, Wilson would 
never have discussed the proceedings of the Convention with his 
son. The papers themselves contain no indication that they 
belong to the work of the Committee of Detail and are not 
overtly dated to 1787. To all appearances, they are simply 
untitled documents, mixed in among the other Wilson papers. 
There would have been no way for Bird to know what they 
represented. 
On Bird’s death, the papers went to his niece (and Wilson’s 
granddaughter) Emily Hollingsworth. In June, 1876, she donated 
to the HSP some papers pertaining both to her uncle and to her 
grandfather. A few months later the director wrote back to say 
the donation was a bit “thin,” and asked whether she had 
additional papers. Hollingsworth thereupon made a further 
donation from her grandfather’s estate. Did she understand that, 
in one or the other of these donations, she was turning over the 
original manuscript drafts of the Constitution? Apparently not. 
She mentions as especially noteworthy an entirely commonplace 
letter from George Washington, and her covering letter 
concludes, “Do not feel obliged to retain any of the Papers you 
deem inadmissible to the repositories of your Society . . . .” The 
archivists at the HSP appear to have had no better 
understanding of what they had been given. Her donation was 
handed to a bookbinder, and sewn into two volumes; the damage 
to some of the more fragile sheets is evident. The Wilson papers 
at the HSP then appear to have been entirely overlooked by 
historians for more than two decades. 
So, more than a century after the Philadelphia Convention, 
essentially all that was known about the Committee of Detail 
was contained in Madison’s brief treatment in the Notes. He 
records that the Committee was appointed, lists its members, 
and reproduces the final printed Report; but about the 
intervening ten days historians possessed no information. 
 
additional donations that came after Hollingsworth’s death), both before and after their 
arrival at the HSP. 
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 3. Re-discovery of the Committee Documents 
In 1899, William M. Meigs published his study of the 
Convention. It is not itself a significant work; but it proudly 
announced the discovery of a document in the hand of Edmund 
Randolph, found among the papers of George Mason, which 
Meigs correctly identified as an early draft of the Constitution 
made at the time of the Committee of Detail.21 How the draft 
came to be in the Mason papers is unknown. Meigs noted that 
“[o]ne other draft [of the Constitution] is known to exist” among 
the Wilson papers at the HSP: note his use of the singular. This 
seems to be the first mention in print of any of the Wilson 
drafts.22 
Meigs did not pursue his own hint, and it appears he did not 
trouble to look closely at the Wilson archive.23 Soon thereafter a 
much more considerable scholar, J. Franklin Jameson, identified 
among the HSP papers not only Wilson’s successive drafts (in 
the plural) of the Constitution, but also a copy in his handwriting 
of the Convention resolutions, and, most surprisingly, a set of 
extracts, also in Wilson’s handwriting, that Jameson, in a fine 
piece of close textual analysis, was able to identify as extracts 
from the New Jersey plan and from the original Pinckney plan. 
Shortly after Jameson, Andrew C. McLaughlin identified in the 
Wilson papers a second and longer set of extracts from the 
Pinckney plan.24 
These new documents from Randolph and Wilson are our 
most important source of information about the inner workings 
of the Committee of Detail and are the most significant archival 
discovery since the publication of Madison’s Notes. Max Farrand 
 
 21. WILLIAM M. MEIGS, THE GROWTH OF THE CONSTITUTION IN THE FEDERAL 
CONVENTION OF 1787, at 317–24 (2d ed. 1900) (announcing discovery of the draft). At 
the time Meigs wrote, the draft was in the possession of Mason’s great-granddaughter, 
see id. at 4; today it is in the Library of Congress. 
 22. Id. at 324. 
 23. Meigs’s book re-arranges the events of the Convention by individual clauses of 
the Constitution, thereby enabling the reader to follow the emergence of any particular 
clause. Id. at 7–10. In effect, it is a book-length index. He describes the Wilson draft as 
being almost identical to the final Committee report; and for that reason he appears to 
have regarded it as containing little new information for his project. Id. at 324. Somehow 
he overlooked the other documents in the Hollingsworth collection. I note that Meigs 
makes it clear in his preface that he was a resident of Philadelphia: he could easily have 
looked. Id. at 6. 
 24. Jameson’s various textual studies are collected in J.F. Jameson, Studies in the 
History of the Federal Convention of 1787, in 1 ANNUAL REPORT FOR THE AMERICAN 
HISTORICAL ASSOCIATION FOR THE YEAR 1902, at 87 (1903). McLaughlin’s contribution 
on the Pinckney Plan appeared as an unsigned note. See Note, Sketch of Pinckney’s Plan 
for a Constitution, 1787, 9 AM. HIST. REV. 735 (1904). 
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carefully collated the new documents and presented them in his 
magisterial 1911 Records (which, incidentally, he dedicated to 
Jameson). One might have thought that such a discovery, in the 
hands of scholars of the caliber of Jameson and Farrand, would 
have led to a re-appraisal of the work of the Committee. But 
that did not happen. Their interests lay elsewhere. Jameson in 
particular turned his energies to clearing up the mystery 
surrounding the Pinckney plan, whose original had been lost, 
presumably in Major Jackson’s bonfire.25 He was able, using the 
Wilson extracts, to reconstruct the proposals that Pinckney had 
submitted in 1787.26 
 4. Historiography of the Committee 
But beyond this painstaking analysis of the documents, 
Jameson and Farrand did not attempt to go. They made no 
effort to reconstruct the exact sequence of events within the 
Committee.27 Farrand’s influential 1913 monograph essentially 
recapitulates the story told by Bancroft, though with a greater 
mastery of the documents. The focus of his account is on the 
events on the floor of the Convention and especially on the 
“great debate.” He treats the Committee of Detail in a short 
chapter of eleven paragraphs.28 
The leading historians of the Convention have been equally 
brief. Charles Warren in 1928 gives the Committee of Detail 
four pages.29 Andrew McLaughlin in 1935 disposes of it in a 
single footnote.30 Irving Brant, writing in 1950, gives it one page.31 
 
 25. The background is complex. Essentially, Pinckney had submitted a plan which 
he subsequently, and implausibly, claimed to have been the plan followed by the 
Convention; but the text of his original plan was lost. This led to considerable 
controversy, summarized in BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 92–99. 
 26. The fullest reconstruction is given by Farrand. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra 
note 2, at 595–609. The results were something of a surprise. On the one hand, Jameson 
was able to show (as Bancroft and others had suspected) that the 1818 document was not 
what Pinckney had presented it as being. On the other hand, it turned out that many 
elements of Pinckney’s plan had in fact found their way into the report of the Committee, 
and thence into the final Constitution. So the plan was not (as many had assumed) simply 
“smothered” by sending it to Committee. Jameson, supra note 24, at 131. 
 27. Jameson explicitly set such matters to one side, and noted that his “present 
concern [was] only with its bearing on the problem of the Pinckney plan . . . .” Id. at 127. 
 28. Farrand, supra note 5, at 124–33. 
 29. CHARLES WARREN, THE MAKING OF THE CONSTITUTION 384-87 (1928). 
Warren’s treatment is less careful than Farrand’s; he gives Randolph “the lion’s share” of 
the credit for the final Report, which is not a plausible interpretation of the documents. 
 30. ANDREW C. MCLAUGHLIN, A CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY OF THE UNITED 
STATES 180 (1935). 
 31. IRVING BRANT, JAMES MADISON: FATHER OF THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1800, 
at 111–12 (1950). Although the pagination splits the discussion onto two pages, the length 
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Clinton Rossiter in 1966 gives it two pages.32 The Colliers, twenty 
years later, also give it two pages.33 The most recent treatment of 
the Committee—also the fullest and most balanced—is that by 
Richard Beeman in 2009. He devotes to it a chapter of eighteen 
pages. The first dozen give circumstantial background and 
discuss the biographies of its members; the final pages 
summarize the substance of its final report.34 As for legal 
scholarship, the most recent edition of Hart & Wechsler, 
following the example of the historians, gives it three sentences.35 
The only extended discussion of the Committee’s work I 
have been able to locate is an article by John C. Hueston, 
published in 1990. Hueston notes with surprise the paucity of 
scholarship; correctly identifies the specifically legal importance 
of the Committee’s contributions (especially in the area of state-
federal relations); and concludes that the Committee, on this 
fundamental matter, “altered the course of the Convention.”36 
Hueston’s article appeared as a student Note in the Yale Law 
Journal and appears to have been entirely overlooked by later 
scholars. 
We are thus left with a curious situation. Farrand’s Records 
reproduce fully sixty pages of complex Committee documents.37 
But (Hueston apart) none of the historical accounts attempts to 
grapple with the technical intricacies. None attempts to develop 
Jameson’s observation, made already in 1903, that “Not a little 
instruction might be derived from this record of the transmu-
tations which our fundamental document, or its germ, underwent 
 
is one page. 
 32. CLINTON ROSSITER, 1787: THE GRAND CONVENTION 200–01 (1966). Rossiter 
attempts to sketch the stages through which the Committee proceeded in a single 
paragraph: as will become clear from the discussion below, I believe he reconstructs the 
events inaccurately. 
 33. CHRISTOPHER COLLIER & JAMES LINCOLN COLLIER, DECISION IN 
PHILADELPHIA: THE CONSTITUTIONAL CONVENTION OF 1787, at 168–69 (1986). 
 34. BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 258–76.  
 35. HART & WECHSLER’S THE FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYSTEM 5–6 
(6th ed., Richard Fallon et al. eds., 2009). It is there asserted that the Committee’s work 
was based in part on “a report drafted in 1781 by a committee of the Continental 
Congress that had sought to revise the Articles of Confederation.” This assertion is taken 
from WARREN, supra note 29; although Warren points to some analogies, his assertion of 
influence is unsupported by the documentary evidence. 
 36. John C. Hueston, Altering the Course of the Constitutional Convention: The 
Role of the Committee of Detail in Establishing the Balance of Federal and State Powers, 
100 YALE L.J. 765, 782 (1990). For my reservations about Hueston’s analysis, see infra 
note 133. I broached these issues at length in an article published in 2008; for my 
reservations about my own analysis, see infra note 42. 
 37. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 129–89. 
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during these eleven [sic] days at the hands of the committee.”38 
The Committee is typically treated as an interlude. Plainly, the 
center of historical curiosity lies elsewhere. Perhaps in the 
background there is a sense that the Committee was merely 
tidying up loose ends: only concerned, as it were, with “details.” 
 5. What the Committee Did 
It is not difficult to show that more needs to be said. For 
terminological convenience it will be helpful to divide the 
Convention into three “Acts.” Act I covers everything that 
occurred through July 26. Act II is the Committee of Detail; and 
Act III is everything that happened afterwards, from August 6 
through the signing on September 17. 
I mentioned that most discussions of the Committee’s work 
in the leading monographs take no more than a page or two. The 
discussions of Act I and Act III typically run to several hundred 
pages. That this is inadequate can perhaps most readily be seen 
as follows. The Virginia resolutions introduced by Edmund 
Randolph at the end of May fill three pages in Farrand’s printed 
edition. Two months later, at the end of July, the Convention 
resolutions delivered to the Committee of Detail fill six pages. In 
other words, by the end of Act I, after prolonged debate, the 
Convention had managed, roughly speaking, to add three pages 
to Madison’s plan. The Committee of Detail then went to work. 
It labored for a little over a week. Its draft of the Constitution 
fills twelve pages—adding six pages, and doubling the length. 
The Convention then resumed business and worked for a further 
six weeks. The result was the final version of the Constitution, 
which fills fifteen of Farrand’s pages. Page for page, and day for 
day, the Committee of Detail was the most intense period of 
drafting of the entire summer. 
These facts are of course not by themselves dispositive. It 
might turn out that the Committee contributions were insignifi-
cant, or that they were later rejected by the Convention: and in 
some cases that is what happened. Still, as every lawyer knows, 
the power to draft even a common contract, let alone a constitu-
tion, is the power to shape the contours and the language and 
the emphases of the document; and, in the case of the 
Committee of Detail, it was also the power to structure the 
ensuing debates of Act III. 
 
 38. Jameson, supra note 24, at 127. 
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So one needs to inspect the substance. The most 
fundamental contributions of the Committee may be roughly 
divided into two categories. The first category is a set of 
provisions relating to slavery and navigation acts—the issues that 
General Pinckney had raised just before the Committee was 
established. These provisions were to embroil the Convention in 
deep acrimony during Act III. That acrimony and its source in 
the Committee Report is well known and looms large in the 
standard histories of the Convention.39 
The second category is the one on which I wish to focus. It is 
a set of more technically legal provisions. The Committee 
introduced to the Constitution a number of fundamental struc-
tural features. The most important are as follows. It introduced 
an explicit enumeration of congressional powers. It introduced a 
list of powers prohibited to the states. It introduced the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, and the Supremacy Clause. It 
gave the first detailed specification of the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. It added the clause on privileges and immunities, 
the Full Faith and Credit Clause, and the guarantee of 
republican government. It refined many of the powers of the 
chief executive, especially in relation to Congress. These 
matters, although some of them had antecedents in the Articles 
or the state constitutions, had scarcely been discussed by the 
Convention in Act I. They were the accomplishment of the 
Committee of Detail; and, with remarkably little discussion, 
their substance went more-or-less unchanged into the final text 
of the Constitution. And they are hardly “details.” They 
represent, in fact, the very core of American federalism: the 
distinctive contribution of the Philadelphia Convention to 
western constitutional governance. 
It may be helpful here to distinguish between the history of 
the Convention and the history of constitutional law. Act I, with 
its bitter arguments over proportional representation, belongs 
primarily to the history of the Convention. The Connecticut 
Compromise is unquestionably important. Without it, the 
Convention would have collapsed. But from the point of view of 
constitutional law it is of little significance. It has given rise to no 
extensive body of litigation. If it could be altered—if voting 
strength in the Senate were more nearly proportional to 
population—perhaps the new system would be somewhat more 
 
 39. The leading discussion is by BEEMAN, supra note 5, who gives extensive 
references to the monograph literature. 
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democratic.40 But the United States and its constitutional system 
would be recognizably the same. That is not true for the 
structural contributions of the Committee of Detail. Without the 
enumeration of powers, without the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, the shape of the federal government would be radically 
different. Without the architecture of the federal courts, judicial 
review would be radically different. Without the Supremacy 
Clause, it would probably not exist. And so on down the list. The 
high drama of Act I has attracted most of the scholarly attention: 
but from the point of view of constitutional law, Act II is 
unquestionably more important. 
 6. Central Questions 
These observations raise a host of questions. First we have a 
set of questions concerning the work of the Committee of Detail 
itself. How were these structural provisions inserted into the 
draft of the Constitution? Is there a relationship between the 
structural provisions and the slavery provisions? Which mem-
bers of the Committee were principally responsible for the 
drafting? What were they intending to achieve? Were they 
acting ultra vires? Did they have a hidden agenda? Were they 
divided among themselves or did they act as a unit? Did they 
have a chairman? How, in concrete terms, did they go about the 
task of drafting? Did they write the drafts sitting together as a 
group or did they delegate the task to one of their number? 
What are we to make of the fact that most of the documents are 
in Wilson’s hand? Does this show him to have been the principal 
author? Why was Madison not a member? Did the Committee 
do its work in secret or did it consult with other delegates? On 
what resources did it draw? What documents did it have at its 
disposal and what are the legal and intellectual sources for its 
contributions? 
Behind these primary questions about the Committee lurks 
a second group of questions about evidence. What documents do 
we possess? How were they made and for what purpose? What 
was their subsequent history and how did they come to be where 
they are today? Are they complete? How have they been 
handled by editors and textual scholars? I take it to be obvious 
that our confidence in the answers to the primary questions must 
depend in large part on how we answer the secondary questions. 
 
 40. This is the position of ROBERT DAHL, HOW DEMOCRATIC IS THE AMERICAN 
CONSTITUTION? (2001). 
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This much is straightforward. But there is also a 
considerably more puzzling tertiary question. The documents I 
have mentioned are all available in Farrand’s Records. If it is 
true that the work of the Committee of Detail was of such 
fundamental importance, why was that fact not noticed long 
ago? Why have the primary questions not been asked with 
greater insistence? 
 7. Historiography Revisited 
A full answer to that tertiary question would take us far 
beyond the bounds of this Article, and I postpone it to another 
occasion. But for now let us consider more closely the inter-
pretations of the Committee of Detail offered by the leading 
scholars. Farrand’s early analysis of 1913 is sober and careful.41 
He makes some plausible conjectures (which he is careful to 
label as conjectures) about how the Committee did its work. His 
account does not stray far from the documents: and he had the 
advantage of having worked closely with the originals. He points 
out correctly that the Committee made extensive use of the 
Articles of Confederation; and he carefully describes the 
organization of the final Committee draft. He briefly mentions 
the slave-trade provisions and the enumeration of powers; 
surprisingly, he does not notice the Necessary and Proper 
Clause, or the Supremacy Clause. He does not attempt to 
analyze the likely contributions of the individual members or to 
work out in detail the sequence of events. His account is 
accurate as far as it goes; but it leaves most of the primary 
questions unaddressed. 
Farrand was evidently aware of the need for a closer study 
of the Committee texts. He could not possibly have thought his 
brief sketch would be the last word on the subject. But, 
ironically, the very transcriptions of the Committee documents 
that he for the first time made available in the Records may 
themselves have inhibited later scholarship. Not that Farrand 
was careless. The documents are arranged in the correct 
chronological sequence; his transcriptions are painstaking and, 
for the most part, accurate. The problem lies elsewhere. The 
original drafts contain frequent deletions and insertions and 
marginal comments—sometimes in the hand of Wilson, 
sometimes of Rutledge, sometimes of Randolph. Farrand 
(perhaps constrained by his publisher) rendered these altera-
 
 41.  FARRAND, supra note 5, at 124–33. 
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tions by a typographical system of italics and brackets that 
makes it almost impossible to understand what is happening. 
Comments that in the original are interlineated and assigned to a 
specific point in the text are rendered indistinguishable from 
marginal comments assigned to no point in particular: one loses 
sense of what goes with what, and of the exact sequence of the 
changes. The task of working out the textual issues is laborious, 
even if one has access to the original manuscripts. If one relies 
on the published transcriptions, it becomes far more difficult: 
almost impossible.42 At any rate, and for whatever reason, later 
scholars did not subject the documents themselves to further 
close scrutiny. 
As we move beyond these textual matters and consider the 
substance of what historians have said about the Committee and 
its internal workings, we find—to put it mildly—no unanimity. 
There are five principal theories. (1) The Committee Theory. 
One group of historians (Farrand is an example) treats the 
members of the Committee as a more-or-less undifferentiated 
whole and does not try to calculate the contributions of 
individual members. (2) The James Wilson Theory. Another 
group (apparently influenced by the observation that most of the 
Committee Documents are in his handwriting) takes James 
Wilson to be the Committee mastermind. Brant, for example, 
treating Wilson as a surrogate for Madison, says, “On the 
straight drafting job, this might be called a committee of Wilson 
and four others. With Wilson on, it mattered little that Madison 
was off.”43 (3) The Rutledge-and-the-Slave-Power Theory. For 
over eighty years, the early historians of the Convention—
Bancroft, Farrand, Brant, Rossiter—paid little attention to the 
issue of slavery. But after the 1960s the focus of historical 
research began to change. The spotlight shifted to the slavery 
 
 42. Credite vulnerato. In an article about James Wilson published in 2008 I called 
attention to the importance of the Committee of Detail and, dividing the Convention 
into three “Acts,” argued that Act II was fully as consequential as Act I or Act III. I then 
attempted to piece together its internal workings. William Ewald, James Wilson and the 
Drafting of the Constitution, 10 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 901, 983–93 (2008). At the time I 
relied on Farrand’s transcriptions; and although the general analysis still seems to me 
correct, a close examination of the originals quickly made it clear that I had badly 
understated the contributions of Randolph and somewhat overstated those of Wilson. 
That 2008 article supplies background for the present study, especially for Wilson’s role 
in Act I and for his relations with Madison; but the portion dealing with the Committee 
of Detail is superseded. New transcriptions and a photographic reproduction of the 
manuscripts are provided in COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20. 
 43. BRANT, supra note 31, at 111. Others who take a similar view are Clinton 
Rossiter, Charles Page Smith, and Nicholas Pedersen. Nicholas Pedersen, The Lost 
Founder: James Wilson in American Memory, 22 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 257 (2010).  
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provisions, and John Rutledge rather than Wilson now becomes 
the Committee mastermind. Rossiter as late as 1966 could write 
(incidentally, without adducing any evidence) that Rutledge, as 
Committee chairman, “kept his colleagues hard at work [and] 
reduced controversy to a minimum.” But a few years later 
Rutledge, far from “reducing controversy,” stood accused of 
aggressively defending the interests of the Slave Power. “The 
report of the Committee of Detail,” wrote Donald Robinson in 
1971, “was a monument to Southern craft and gall.”44 This view 
has been influential; and David Stuart in 2007 discusses the 
Committee under the chapter title, “Rutledge Hijacks the 
Constitution.”45 (4) The Rutledge-Wilson Theory. Others, while 
rejecting the “hijacking” thesis, emphasize the alleged close 
friendship between Wilson and Rutledge, who are seen as the 
two dominant spirits of the Committee.46 (5) The States’ Rights 
Theory. Hueston advances a different sort of “hijack thesis.” On 
his account the larger Convention had favored a “stronger 
national model” in which the legislature would exercise a 
general grant of legislative authority; but the five members of 
the Committee, all adherents of “states’ rights,” worked to place 
limitations on the national model, and in particular to add the 
constraint of an enumeration of powers.47 
This is a remarkable range of interpretations. It is perhaps 
evident that not all the theories can be correct: what is more 
surprising is that none of them is. And it is not terribly hard to 
see what has happened. The historians are interested in 
something else—the Connecticut Compromise, or slavery, or the 
social background of the Convention—at any rate, not in 
technical law, and not in what Rossiter, in a chapter title, called 
“Details, details, details.” So when they come to the Committee 
they treat it briskly and substitute an interpretation that fits their 
own preoccupations. 
 
 44. DONALD ROBINSON, SLAVERY IN THE STRUCTURE OF AMERICAN POLITICS, 
1765–1820, at 218 (1971). Or again: “The Convention could not have produced at this 
critical point an intersectional committee in whose hands the interests of slave owners 
would have been safer.” Id. at 217.  
 45. DAVID STEWART, THE SUMMER OF 1787, at 163–75 (2007). 
 46. This is essentially the position of Richard Beeman; BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 
269. Beeman, in my view correctly, rejects the overstatements of Stewart and the 
“hijack” school (id. at 478). This is also the position of SMITH, infra note 158, and 
perhaps ROSSITER, supra note 32 at 201, as well, unfortunately, as Ewald, supra note 42. 
For the factual problems, see infra, notes 157–158. 
 47.  Hueston, supra note 36.  
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At bottom, what is missing is three things: first, a clear 
realization of the specifically legal importance of the con-
tributions of Act II; secondly, an understanding of the 
complexities involved in trying to piece together the internal 
workings of the Committee; thirdly, recourse to the original 
documents. 
My concern here is with what I earlier called the primary 
and secondary questions: with attempting to reconstruct, so far 
as is possible, the workings and the contributions of the 
Committee of Detail, and with assessing the quality of the 
documentary evidence. This is a long Article; even so, it should 
be stressed that it is by no means complete. One important 
subplot—the presence of the Pinckney extracts in the Wilson 
archive—requires such a lengthy analysis that I have omitted it 
entirely. Many lesser matters also have had to be left to one side: 
the aim here is to concentrate on the fundamentals. The 
Historical Society of Pennsylvania provided access to the 
original documents in the Wilson collection; and the Library of 
Congress made available scanned images of the Randolph 
draft.48 
About the tertiary question I shall have little to say. No 
doubt the neglect of the Committee of Detail has something to 
do with the great literary merits of Madison’s Notes: with the 
drama of the debates, with the colorful anecdotes, with the 
unforgettable cast of characters. The Notes are Technicolor: the 
records of the Committee of Detail are black-and-white, and in 
many respects a silent picture. But although these facts 
undoubtedly play a role, they do not seem to me to provide, 
even remotely, an adequate explanation. The issues here (I 
believe) lie extremely deep; but they lie beyond the scope of this 
Article, and I shall defer them to another time. 
II. THE COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS 
A. OVERVIEW OF THE DOCUMENTS 
Because we do not have Madison’s Notes to guide us, the 
interpretation of the work of the Committee depends on a close 
 
 48. These are transcribed with photographic reproductions in CONVENTION 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20. For the convenience of readers I also give references to the 
corresponding pages in Farrand’s CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2; if there are 
discrepancies, that is because Farrand’s transcriptions are being corrected sub silentio.  
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inspection of papers that were not written for the convenience of 
historians. Let me start by saying something about these 
Committee documents in general and then examine them one-
by-one. 
The first document (the one identified by Meigs) is in the 
handwriting of Edmund Randolph, with comments in the 
distinctive, spiky hand of John Rutledge. The document consists 
of five sheets of paper, written (except for the last sheet) on both 
sides. This document is currently housed at the Library of 
Congress. 
All the other Committee documents are in the Wilson 
archive at the HSP, and all are in Wilson’s handwriting. They 
contain, first, a list, on a single folio sheet, folded to make four 
pages, of the twenty-four resolutions that the Convention 
referred to the Committee. The Convention was sensitive about 
not permitting copies to be made of its resolutions. Early in the 
proceedings it resolved that no copies be taken “without leave of 
the House” (and in fact on July 25 refused permission to Luther 
Martin to make a copy).49 Wilson’s text of the resolutions and the 
version in Madison’s Notes are the only two copies known to 
have survived. (I note in passing that the Wilson archive contains 
a second list of Convention resolutions, dating from earlier in the 
summer, and presumably made for his own use; that he was 
permitted to take them perhaps indicates something of his 
standing within the Convention.) 
On six smaller pages, bound together into a signature, 
Wilson has listed twenty-five provisions that McLaughlin and 
Farrand identified as coming from the Pinckney Plan. There are 
a couple of other, smaller and relatively insignificant sheets, and 
a half-folio page, written on both sides, containing extracts from 
the New Jersey and the Pinckney plans. 
The most important documents are two drafts of the 
Constitution. Both are written on folio sheets that have been 
folded to make four-page signatures. The first draft, which 
originally consisted of three signatures, is missing its middle 
signature; the last is nearly identical to the final report of the 
Committee. 
It is important to stress just how little we know about the 
internal workings of the Committee. We do not know exactly 
 
 49. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (May 29); 2 CONVENTION 
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 107 (July 25). 
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how the Convention viewed their charge—whether they were 
expected simply to write up the existing resolutions, or expected 
also to add substantive provisions. The few scraps of 
information—e.g., Washington’s diary entry mentioned above—
point to the first interpretation, but are inconclusive.50 Nor can 
much be inferred from the name, “Committee of Detail”: to call 
something a detail is not necessarily to say it is unimportant. We 
do not know where the Committee met, or when, or how often; 
we do not know whether there were heated internal debates, nor 
how they would have been resolved. It is certain that some 
Wilson documents have gone missing; and if Rutledge or 
Ellsworth or Gorham kept notes or records, they have not 
survived. 
Two of the surviving documents—the Randolph draft and 
the final Wilson draft—contain extensive annotations by 
Rutledge; numerous provisions have also been checked off, both 
here and in the earlier Wilson draft. Many historians have 
inferred that the check marks are Rutledge’s: that he presided 
over the meetings and made the insertions as the Committee 
discussed the successive drafts. But other papers in the Wilson 
archive bear similar check-marks. They are most likely his, and 
not Rutledge’s.51 
At this stage, a warning is in season. It is important not to 
leap from these facts to a tempting and obvious conclusion. 
Almost all of the early drafts of the Constitution are in Wilson’s 
hand. Even the Randolph draft contains Wilson’s check marks. 
He was a powerful member of the Convention, a skilled 
legislative draftsman, and possessed remarkable energy. Many 
historians have inferred that he must have utterly dominated the 
proceedings: in Brant’s phrase, that it was a Committee of 
“Wilson and four others.” But that is too hasty. In the first place, 
from the fact that most of the surviving documents are in 
Wilson’s hand, nothing whatsoever can be inferred; and indeed, 
many provisions that he strongly and consistently opposed 
appear for the first time in his drafts. It was Rutledge, not 
 
 50. Supra note 15. Or again, the delegate Hugh Williamson wrote to James Iredell 
on July 22 that “After much labor the Convention have nearly agreed on the principles 
and outlines of a system, which we hope may fairly be called an amendment of the 
Federal Government. This system we expect will, in three or four days, be referred to a 
small committee, to be properly dressed . . . .” 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 
61. 
 51. I owe this observation to Lorianne Updike Toler. The most reasonable 
conjecture is that the check marks were made by Wilson in the course of writing up the 
next draft: he would have wished to be sure that all of Randolph’s points were included. 
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Wilson, who ultimately presented the Committee’s report to the 
Convention; and as we shall see, on many issues, Wilson, far 
from being dominant, appears to have been outflanked by 
Rutledge and the others. But there is a further point. Anybody 
who has attempted to work with the manuscripts quickly comes 
to recognize Randolph’s legible but uneven scrawl, and to dread 
the wild and idiosyncratic jottings of Rutledge. Wilson, in con-
trast, displays excellent penmanship. He wrote an elegant 
cursive: quite possibly for this reason he was chosen as the 
Committee amanuensis. 
The issues here are complex and require careful analysis. In 
particular, it is necessary to try to reconstruct, so far as is 
possible, the exact sequence of the internal workings of the 
Committee.52 That involves, as a first step, closely inspecting the 
various documents, placing them in chronological order, and 
observing which provisions were added at which stage. One then 
wants to try to reconstruct who is likely to have been responsible 
for which provisions and that involves careful crosschecking. The 
basic principles are as follows. (1) If Madison’s Notes show that, 
on the floor of the Convention, a provision was opposed by one 
of the Committeemen, either before or after the Committee did 
its work, that is good prima facie evidence that the provision was 
the handiwork of somebody else: mutatis mutandis if the 
Committee member spoke in favor of the provision. It should be 
emphasized that this evidence is only prima facie: delegates must 
often have made arguments, not on their own initative, but in 
support of an ally, or from some other tactical calculation. It 
should also be emphasized that our evidence is extremely 
incomplete and that one cannot always confidently infer from 
what Madison reports as having been said on the floor to what a 
member did in Committee; but the more frequent and more 
emphatic the declarations on the floor, the more confidence we 
are entitled to place in the inference. (2) One needs also to make 
use of whatever is known about the general biographical 
backgrounds of the Committee members, about their general 
political views, and about the views of their state delegations; but 
in the nature of things, that evidence is less probative than 
 
 52. It is odd that the task has apparently not been attempted in a sustained manner 
before. Exemplary in this regard is CHARLES C. THACH, JR., THE CREATION OF THE 
PRESIDENCY, 1775–1789: A STUDY IN CONSTITUTIONAL HISTORY 94–104 (1922). 
Although Thach’s discussion is confined to the executive branch, he clearly understands 
the methodological issues, and he devotes ten insightful pages to the Committee of 
Detail. He is careful in his inferences, and careful, too, to try to establish the individual 
views of the Committee members as expressed on the floor of the Convention. 
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evidence from the Convention itself. (One thinks of Madison, 
whose views shifted dramatically over the years.) (3) It is of 
course necessary to pay close attention to the materials formally 
entrusted to the Committee by the Convention—viz., the 
Convention resolutions and the New Jersey and Pinckney plans. 
But one must also consider other documents which they had at 
their disposal and of which they certainly made use—notably the 
Articles of Confederation, but also the Constitutions of the 
states (especially New York, Massachusetts, and Virginia). Much 
of the specific language of the Committee Report was taken 
from these sources. 
Let us now examine the documents and attempt to 
reconstruct, so far as is possible, the sequence of events within 
the Committee. 
B. DOCUMENTS I, II, AND III 
I begin with a terminological point. Jameson and Farrand 
confronted a number of scattered pieces of paper relating to the 
Committee of Detail. They were able to work out the 
chronological sequence: as we shall see, the internal evidence is 
compelling. In the Records, Farrand arranged this material into a 
sequence of documents, which he numbered I through IX. Not 
all of these documents can be regarded as a “draft of the 
Constitution”—that is, as a fully articulated scheme of national 
government. I shall therefore speak of the nine documents, 
reserving the term draft for the more substantial items in the list. 
About Document I there is not much to say. It is a list, 
entirely in Wilson’s handwriting, of the resolutions of the 
Convention up to July 23. The content is no surprise: a three-
branch national government, with a bicameral legislature in 
whose second chamber each state shall have two votes, with its 
lower chamber elected in proportion to population, and with a 
broad grant of national legislative power. 
Farrand supplemented Wilson’s list with his own brief 
Document II, which lists the Convention resolutions taken on 
July 24-26, i.e. between the appointment of the Committee and 
its first meeting. 
Document III is the longer of Wilson’s two sets of extracts 
from the Pinckney Plan and was discovered by Andrew 
McLaughlin.53 Farrand doubtless placed it at this point in the 
 
 53. Note, supra note 24. 
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sequence because he knew that the Pinckney Plan, submitted to 
the Convention on May 29 and promptly tabled, had been 
referred to the Committee. However, that original document 
would have been in Pinckney’s handwriting, not in Wilson’s; and 
it is not even clear that this particular set of extracts belongs to 
the work of the Committee of Detail. It is physically different 
from the other Wilson manuscripts: a small, bound signature, 
whereas the other documents are written on folio sheets. It is 
entirely possible that this Document was made at some other 
time, possibly as early as mid-May, when Pinckney was 
attempting to interest other delegates in his scheme.54 The 
Pinckney Plan, in any case, raises subtle issues that I shall 
postpone to another occasion. 
C. DRAFT IV 
 1. Overview 
The next document—Farrand’s Document IV—is con-
siderably longer.55 It has a good claim to be the first draft of the 
Constitution, stricto sensu. It is almost entirely in the hand of 
Edmund Randolph, with annotations by John Rutledge. 
As I noted earlier, the committee—Gorham (Massachusetts), 
Ellsworth (Connecticut), Wilson (Pennsylvania), Randolph 
(Virginia), and Rutledge (South Carolina)—was evidently 
chosen with an eye to geographical balance. Why was Randolph 
selected from Virginia, and not Madison? A number of factors 
no doubt played a part. In the first place, Randolph was a 
Randolph of Virginia, at the time probably the most socially 
prominent family in the nation. (Jefferson’s own aristocratic 
pedigree came through his mother’s connection to the 
Randolphs: not through the Jefferson line). He was, in addition, 
the Governor of the largest and most influential state in the 
Union; he was an eminent lawyer; and he had formally presented 
the Virginia Plan to the Convention. Indeed, the other delegates, 
who frequently referred to “Mr. Randolph’s plan,” may well 
have assumed that Randolph (rather than the more junior 
Madison) was the author: a point on which Madison appears to 
have been sensitive in his later years.56 But regardless of what the 
 
 54. See, e.g., 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 25 (May 21) and 39 (June 
10) for indications that Pinckney was circulating his plan. 
 55. Transcribed at COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, 263–85. 
 56. Madison, as he revised his Notes for publication, took pains to ward off such a 
misunderstanding and explicitly pointed out that he had conveyed to Randolph before 
!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2012 2:08 PM 
2012] THE COMMITTEE OF DETAIL 221 
 
delegates thought, in terms of parliamentary procedure the 
assignment of the Committee of Detail was to revise the plan 
Randolph had submitted on May 29, as modified first by the 
Committee of the Whole and then by the Convention. (The 
delegates were sensitive to these parliamentary distinctions, and 
when the Committee of the Whole formally reported to the 
Convention, or the Convention committed matters to the 
Committee, it was always made clear that the discussion referred 
to the “plan of Mr. Randolph.”57) These facts are adequate to 
explain his presence on the Committee; and with Randolph of 
Virginia on, Madison of Virginia was necessarily off. 
There can be no doubt that Document IV dates to late July, 
for it incorporates the “Connecticut compromise” of July 
sixteenth. Randolph had vehemently and repeatedly opposed 
that result. We can therefore conclude that the document is not a 
private record of his own constitutional preferences. It is also 
easily seen to antedate the various Wilson drafts, which 
incorporate verbatim numerous items from the Randolph 
document, but then go on to add further provisions. For all these 
reasons, Document IV can be confidently assigned to the time 
either just before or just after the Committee began to meet. 
Whether it should be viewed as a product of the deliberations of 
the Committee is a more difficult question which I shall discuss 
in due course. 
 2. Randolph and Mason 
I mentioned that the document itself was discovered among 
the papers of George Mason.58 How Randolph’s draft of the 
Constitution came to be located in Mason’s papers is unknown. 
But Randolph and Mason had a great deal in common. Both 
were descendants of aristocratic Virginia families. Although 
Randolph was nearly thirty years younger than Mason, they had 
known each other and worked together since the early days of 
the Revolution. Beyond that, at the end of the Convention they 
were to be the two great “recusants” from Virginia. They refused 
 
the Convention the central ideas of the Virginia Plan. See 9 THE PAPERS OF JAMES 
MADISON 383 (April 16, 1787) (Robert A. Rutland et al. eds., 1975) [hereinafter 
MADISON PAPERS]. 
 57. For representative instances, see 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 238 
(June 13), 240 (June 14), 242 (June 15), 249 (June 16), 282 (June 18) and 322 (June 19). 
 58. I note in passing that although George Bancroft consulted papers that were in 
the hands of George Mason’s son, he does not appear to have seen the Mason papers in 
Philadelphia that contained the Randolph manuscript; at any rate, that manuscript is not 
mentioned anywhere in BANCROFT, supra note 19. 
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to sign the Constitution and in the process nearly scuttled its 
ratification—a fact that severely (and, in the case of Mason, 
irreparably) strained their relations with Washington.59 The 
trajectory of their relationship is complex. At the time of the 
refusal to sign—i.e., in the last days of the Convention—they 
were close allies; and it is a reasonable conjecture that this is the 
moment at which Randolph shared his draft with Mason, 
possibly in preparation for the ratification debates. But when 
Randolph some weeks later decided after all to support 
ratification, Mason felt betrayed and began to refer to Randolph 
as “young A----d” (i.e. “Arnold”).60 Randolph’s History of 
Virginia, written around 1808 after Mason’s death, was more 
generous to the older man.61 But beyond all these facts there is a 
further deep appropriateness that the first draft of the 
Constitution should have found its way into the papers of 
George Mason—and also a certain deep irony. 
To understand this document, it is important to begin by 
considering the way in which the project of drafting a 
Constitution would have presented itself to the members of the 
Committee. The basic structure of American constitutions in fact 
goes back to the work of George Mason eleven years earlier. On 
May 10, 1776 the Continental Congress instructed the colonies to 
organize new governments. On May 15, probably before 
knowing of this vote, the Virginia Convention appointed a 
committee to draft a bill of rights and a constitution. The com-
mittee was large, unwieldy, and, as Mason said, “over-charged 
with useless members.”62 Partly to expedite matters and partly to 
ward off the “thousand ridiculous and impracticable proposals”63 
he expected it to produce, he went to work on his own. He must 
have worked with astonishing speed. We do not know exactly 
when he finished. But on May 27—just eight days after his 
 
 59. For a thorough account of their activities during the ratification debates, see 
PAULINE MAIER, RATIFICATION: THE PEOPLE DEBATE THE CONSTITUTION, 1787–1788, 
at 216, 242, 318–19 (2010). Washington attributed Mason’s recusal to “pride . . . and . . . 
want of manly candor” (Washington to James Craik, Sept. 8, 1789), and shortly before 
Mason’s death referred to him as “my neighbor and quondam friend” (Washington to 
Hamilton, July 29, 1792). 
 60. ROBERT A. RUTLAND, GEORGE MASON, RELUCTANT STATESMAN 103 (1961). 
 61. EDMUND RANDOLPH, THE HISTORY OF VIRGINIA 255 (reprinted in 1970) 
(1808). 
 62. 1 THE PAPERS OF GEORGE MASON 271–72 (Robert A. Rutland ed., 1970) 
[hereinafter MASON PAPERS] (transcribing a letter sent by George Mason to Richard 
Henry Lee). The most thorough general biography of Mason is JEFF BROADWATER, 
GEORGE MASON, FORGOTTEN FOUNDER (2006). 
 63. 1 MASON PAPERS, supra note 62, at 271. 
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appointment to the Committee—his draft had been debated by 
the Committee, modified, voted upon, and referred back to the 
full Convention. The Committee report on a Declaration of 
Rights was published in the Virginia newspapers on June 1 and 
appeared in Philadelphia on June 6: that is, less than a month 
after the initial vote of Congress.64 
Meanwhile, Mason turned his attention to the Virginia 
Constitution. He presented a draft to the Committee by June 10; 
after some debate, a revised version was ordered to be printed, 
and was formally reported to the Convention on the 24th. 
(Mason’s drafts have been lost, so it is not known how 
extensively the Committee revised his original scheme.) By July 
4, 1776, his work had been widely distributed throughout the 
United States; and it provided the pattern for most of the state 
constitutions that were to follow.65 Mason’s work during these 
few weeks was one of the most remarkable episodes of the 
Revolution, fully comparable in importance to Jefferson’s 
simultaneous writing of the Declaration of Independence, and at 
least as influential.66 
Within a few years, all American states had enacted con-
stitutions of their own. Most followed Mason’s structure: first, a 
lengthy declaration of rights (usually copied more or less directly 
from Mason); this was followed by what was typically called a 
frame of government.67 The frame of government was invariably 
organized into a four-part sequence: legislature, executive, 
judiciary, and miscellaneous provisions. The nomenclature is not 
constant. Sometimes, the word “constitution” is employed to 
 
 64. Id. at 274–91. 
 65. The surviving drafts of the Virginia Constitution and careful editorial 
commentary are provided in id. at 295–310. Both Madison and Jefferson, by the middle 
1780s, were critical of the Virginia Constitution for its inequality in representation, for its 
property qualification for voting rights, and for its clumsy executive council. Id. at 310. 
 66. It should be remembered—as emphasized in PAULINE MAIER, AMERICAN 
SCRIPTURE 160–70 (1997)—that Jefferson’s Declaration did not achieve its iconic status 
until decades later, after Jefferson had grown into the towering figure of early 
nineteenth-century politics: originally, the Fourth of July was celebrated to 
commemorate the fact of separation from Britain rather than the document. For the first 
decades after Independence, Mason’s work, and particularly his Bill of Rights, was 
considerably more influential than Jefferson’s Declaration; it was to provide the pattern 
for all subsequent bills of rights, both domestically and overseas, and notably for the 
French Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen. 
 67. The most convenient source for the early state constitutions is unfortunately 
still the collection edited by Francis Newton Thorpe. A new edition is badly needed. THE 
FEDERAL AND STATE CONSTITUTIONS: COLONIAL CHARTERS, AND OTHER ORGANIC 
LAWS OF THE STATES, TERRITORIES, AND COLONIES NOW OR HERETOFORE FORMING 
THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA (Francis Newton Thorpe ed., 1909). 
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designate both the declaration (or “bill”) of rights and the frame 
(or “form”) of government; but sometimes it is used to designate 
the frame alone. Some of the early 1776 constitutions 
incorporate a list of grievances, more or less copied from the 
Declaration of Independence, against the King; most do not. 
Sometimes (as in the Massachusetts Constitution of 1780), the 
bill of rights is further subdivided into a “preamble” and a 
“declaration”; sometimes (as in New York) a bill of rights is 
omitted altogether. 
 3. Randolph’s Background 
I shall return to these facts and to George Mason later: they 
turn out to be important for understanding the Randolph draft. 
For now, it is important to understand something of the 
personality of Edmund Randolph.68 He was descended from the 
most prominent family in Virginia; his father and great-
grandfather were both distinguished lawyers; his uncle and 
grandfather both served in the colonial government as Attorney 
General. On the outbreak of revolution, his father remained 
loyal to the crown and ultimately took sail for England; his 
uncle, in contrast, became a leader of the revolutionary forces. 
Edmund cast his lot with his uncle. In the years leading up to 
1787 he had held a variety of positions: aide-de-camp to George 
Washington, a member of the Continental Congress, a member 
of the Virginia legislature, Attorney General of Virginia, and 
(from November, 1786) Governor. He had established himself as 
one of the most prominent lawyers in Virginia, with a thriving 
practice and with experience in litigating cases of public 
significance. Unlike most Virginia aristocrats, he was a lawyer 
rather than a planter, and had little personal stake in the 
institution of slavery. Like the rest of the Virginia delegation, he 
appears to have assumed and hoped that slavery would 
eventually wither away.69 He was one of the principal organizers 
of the Annapolis conference and instrumental in persuading 
Washington to attend the Philadelphia convention. He was 
clearly a man of great intelligence and practical experience. But, 
unlike Madison, Hamilton, or Wilson, he displays little interest 
in abstract questions of political philosophy. He also changed his 
mind often during the convention, and it is this fact which makes 
 
 68. See generally JOHN J. REARDON, EDMUND RANDOLPH: A BIOGRAPHY (1974). 
 69. This matter is discussed infra note 155 and accompanying text. 
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it especially difficult to work out his precise views during the 
Committee of Detail. 
For the first weeks of the summer, as the Convention 
debated what he no doubt thought of as the Randolph proposals, 
he appears to have been an enthusiastic if somewhat dogmatic 
participant, occasionally intervening with warnings against the 
excesses of democracy and “the demagogues of the popular 
branch.”70 He was hostile to Wilson’s idea of a single executive, 
calling it “the foetus of monarchy.”71 During the “great debate” 
he was adamantly on the side of Madison and Wilson. But after 
the defeat of July 16, his mood appears to have soured, and over 
the remainder of the summer his remarks (if Madison’s Notes 
accurately capture their spirit) grew increasingly cantankerous.72 
By August 29 he was saying “that there were features so odious 
in the Constitution as it now stands, that he doubted whether he 
should be able to agree to it.”73 
Such remarks set his new tone. From this point forward, he 
routinely threatened to vote against the document, curtly 
declared his “inflexible” opposition; and, having already 
denounced democracy, now expressed his fear that the 
Constitution was tending towards monarchy and aristocracy.74 
And in the end, of course, he did refuse to sign the Constitution. 
But then he exhibited another aspect of his personality. Did 
his refusal to sign mean that he would oppose ratification? Not 
at all, he assured the Convention. He “did not mean by this 
refusal to decide that he should oppose the Constitution without 
doors. He meant only to keep himself free to be governed by his 
duty as it should be prescribed by his future judgment.”75 After 
further reflection, he changed his mind again, and supported the 
 
 70. Randolph made remarks of this tenor on May 29, May 31, and June 12; his 
remarks about democracy occur in in 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26–27 
and 51; the remark about “demagogues” occurs in id. at 218. 
 71. Id. at 65–66 (June 1). 
 72. In the immediate aftermath of the vote of July 16, having found his own 
suggestions for a compromise rejected, he said “he wished the Convention might 
adjourn, that the large States might consider the steps proper to be taken in the present 
solemn crisis of the business . . . .” 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 18 (July 
16). Challenged and asked whether he meant an adjournment sine die, he retreated and 
said he only meant for the rest of the day. Id.; see also REARDON, supra note 68, at 101–
36 (providing copious documentation of Randolph’s growing irritability). 
 73. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 452 (August 29). Randolph was 
speaking in support of Charles Pinckney who had moved for a two-thirds supermajority 
for all laws regulating commerce; in Randolph’s eyes, “[a] rejection of the [Pinckney] 
motion would compleat [sic] the deformity of the system.” Id. 
 74. Id. at 513 (September 5). 
 75. Id. at 645 (September 17). 
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Constitution during the ratification debates. Randolph, in other 
words, for all his brilliance, was highly unpredictable: and his 
contemporaries noticed. His cousin, John Randolph of Roanoke, 
described him as “the chameleon on the aspen, always 
trembling, always changing.”76 For these reasons, despite his 
presentation of the Virginia plan, he has generally been ranked 
by historians as one of the more disappointing delegates to the 
Convention, an erratic figure who made few original 
contributions. But a close inspection of his work on the 
Committee of Detail tells a different story. 
 4. The Randolph Draft 
Let us now turn to the text of Document IV itself. 
Randolph’s draft is long (nine pages in manuscript, filling twelve 
pages in Farrand’s printed transcription—far longer than the 
three printed pages of Convention Resolutions). He incor-
porates the substance of the Resolutions, but adds many new 
items that had not previously been discussed. It would be tedious 
and not especially helpful to compile a detailed list; the main 
points can be summarized as follows. 
The bulk of his additions can be classified as “minor 
matters”—that is, items that needed to be stipulated in a 
completed Constitution, but that did not demand the attention 
of the assembled delegates and that were unlikely to provoke 
prolonged discussion. Examples are: the privilege of members of 
the legislature from arrest; the manner of filling legislative 
vacancies; the rules for quorums and adjournments; the use of 
the terminology (taken from the Virginia Constitution) “House 
of Delegates” and “Senate.” Most of these provisions were 
drawn either from the Articles of Confederation or from the 
state constitutions. (Randolph explicitly mentions his use of the 
Constitution of New York; but the influence of the constitutions 
of Massachusetts and Virginia is also evident.77) There are also a 
 
 76. 2 WILLIAM CABELL BRUCE, JOHN RANDOLPH OF ROANOKE 202 (reprint 1970) 
(1922). Precisely these personality traits were to lead to Randolph’s eventual disgrace at 
the time of the Jay Treaty; the well-known story is told by STANLEY ELKINS & ERIC 
MCKITRICK, THE AGE OF FEDERALISM 424–31 (1993). They describe Washington’s fury, 
and quote Madison’s remark that even Randolph’s “best friends can’t save him from the 
self-condemnation of his political career as explained by himself.” Id. at 431. Knowledge 
of these dramatic later events may have colored historians’ views of Randolph at the 
Convention. 
 77. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 139; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 267 (cancelled reference to “the 16th. article of the New York 
constitution”). Madison decades later noted the influence of the Virginia Constitution; 3 
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few changes to the Convention resolutions that probably 
represent unintended slips.78 Nobody is likely to have objected to 
these minor contributions: this was a job the Committee was 
expected to perform. And it may be that the Convention 
delegates expected the Committee to go no further. 
Other matters, however, are more problematic. To facilitate 
comparisons between drafts, I shall arrange the discussion into 
the standard sequence: legislature, executive, judiciary, and 
miscellaneous. 
  a. The Legislature 
   1) Property Qualifications 
On the last day before its recess, the Convention debated 
the question of property qualifications for members of the 
national government.79 Wilson on principle opposed restrictions 
of this sort; but he spoke only briefly.80 Two other members of 
the Committee—Gorham and Ellsworth—favored leaving the 
question to the legislature. The discussion filled most of the day; 
in the end, the Convention ordered the Committee to require 
“certain qualifications of property” for members of the national 
legislature, executive, and judiciary.81 Randolph (who approved 
of such restrictions) evidently struggled with this charge. He 
 
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 528. 
 78. For instance, Randolph’s draft gives the minimum age for senators as 25. 
COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 269. The Convention resolutions had 
specified 25 as the minimum age for representatives and 30 for senators. This was 
entirely in keeping with Randolph’s view of the more august nature of the Senate, and 
the error was rectified in subsequent drafts. 
 79. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 120–25 (July 26). The provision 
appears in Randolph’s draft. Id. at 139–40. Randolph did not speak to the issue in the 
Convention debate. But property qualifications for legislators are found in most of the 
contemporary state constitutions, and were evidently favored by the Convention; 
Randolph’s remarks on the nature of the Senate (as expressed especially on May 31, but 
also on May 29 and June 12) leave little doubt that he would have voted in favor of 
George Mason’s motion. 
 80. Thus, for example, he declared himself against age restrictions, stating that he 
“was agst. abridging the rights of election in any shape. It was the same thing whether 
this were done by disqualifying the objects of choice, or the persons chusing [sic].” 1 
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 375 (June 22). I infer from the vote of the 
Pennsylvania delegation that Wilson voted against Mason’s motion for property 
requirements. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 121–25 (July 26). 
 81. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 134. The measure passed by a vote 
of 10-1. Id. at 124. It read (as amended): “Resolved That it be an instruction to the 
Committee . . . to receive a clause or clauses, requiring certain qualifications of property 
and citizenship in the United States for the Executive, the Judiciary, and the Members of 
both branches of the Legislature of the United States.” Id. at 134. 
!!!EWALD-282-THECOMMITTEEOFDETAILACCEPTED.DOC (DO NOT DELETE) 12/13/2012 2:08 PM 
228 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 28:197 
 
listed a number of possible restrictions on electors, which he 
then crossed out;82 added a property qualification for Senators, 
but without attempting to specify an exact amount; and omitted 
to include any qualification for the executive or judiciary. 
   2) Senatorial Dominance 
More importantly, the Draft reflects a conception of a 
powerful Senate. This is in keeping with the vision of Madison 
and of the Virginia Plan; and in the aftermath of the 
“Connecticut compromise” of July 16, this was something which 
the small-state delegates could now support. The Randolph 
Draft in particular gives to the Senate the power to make 
treaties of commerce, peace, and alliance; to appoint 
ambassadors; and to appoint the judiciary.83 Only the last of 
these powers had previously been voted upon by the 
Convention.84 The addition of the powers over foreign affairs is 
new and appears to be Randolph’s own interpolation: clearly, he 
is no longer following the script. Wilson in particular would have 
disagreed with giving the Senate these powers, which he 
repeatedly argued should be exercised by the President.85 
(Indeed, even months later, in the Pennsylvania ratification 
convention, he noted that he was “not a blind admirer of this 
system”—and indicated in particular that he objected to the 
Senate’s appointment and treaty powers. However, he consoled 
himself that, because those powers were now shared with the 
 
 82. For electors, Randolph listed several possible restrictions: citizenship, manhood, 
sanity of mind, residency in the state for one year, service in the militia, as well as 
possession of real property—these items are then crossed out. Id. at 139–40; COMMITTEE 
DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 269. In the margin, Rutledge has written, “These 
qualifications not justified by the resolutions.” (Rutledge is correct: the resolutions dealt 
with qualifications for national office, not with qualifications for electors.) Rutledge’s 
own comment has then been cancelled. 
 83. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144–45; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 277. The power to send ambassadors has been added in Rutledge’s 
hand. 
 84. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 119–20 (June 5) and 232–33 
(June 13) (describing the debates and votes on the appointment of the judiciary). The 
Convention resolutions provided for the Senate to appoint the justices of the Supreme 
Court, and for the national legislature to “appoint inferior Tribunals.” “Appoint” here is 
ambiguous, and may merely mean “create”; this would be in accordance with the actual 
vote of June 5. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 125–26 (June 5). In any 
case, the resolutions made no explicit provision for the specifically Senatorial 
appointment of lower federal judges. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132; 
COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 245–47. 
 85. Wilson expressed his views repeatedly at the Convention, both before and after 
the meetings of the Committee of Detail. See, e.g., 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 
2, at 119 (June 5); 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 538 (September 7). 
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President, the Senate “can only show its teeth, it is unable to bite 
or devour.”86) 
   3) Enumeration of Powers 
The Randolph Draft also introduced an enumeration of 
eighteen specific powers of the national legislature.87 The 
Convention had at various points discussed the desirability of an 
enumeration, but had not itself drawn up any such list. Instead, it 
adopted a resolution which reached the Committee of Detail in 
the following language: 
Resolved That the Legislature of the United States ought to 
possess the legislative Rights vested in Congress by the 
Confederation; and moreover to legislate in all Cases for the 
general Interests of the Union, and also in those Cases to 
which the States are separately incompetent, or in which the 
Harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
Exercise of individual Legislation.88 
The language of this resolution does not itself settle the question 
of whether there was to be an enumeration. The issue is highly 
complex; it needs to be considered in conjunction with the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, and I shall return to it when 
discussing Document IX. 
The majority of the enumerated powers appear in 
Randolph’s handwriting: the power to tax, and to regulate 
commerce; to make war and equip armies; to provide tribunals 
for offenses against the laws of nations; to declare the law of 
piracy; to establish post offices; to declare the law of treason; to 
regulate the state militias; to regulate naturalization. In the 
margins, Rutledge has added some further powers: over Indian 
affairs; the power to regulate weights and measures; to borrow 
money; to enforce treaties. 
Where did the enumerated powers come from? Most were 
drawn from the enumeration in the Articles of Confederation. 
Randolph furthermore made explicit the powers to tax, to 
regulate commerce, and to raise an army and navy. But the 
addition of these powers would not have been controversial; 
 
 86. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 162. 
 87. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 142–44; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 273. 
 88. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 131–32; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 245. This language had been adopted by the Convention on July 17. 2 
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 21. 
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indeed, they were virtually the raison d’être of the Convention. 
The power to regulate naturalization appears to be his own 
contribution. 
Ironically, although it appears to have been Randolph who 
first produced the enumeration of powers, and although the 
Convention in essence adopted his handiwork, he was in the end 
to list the “indefinite and dangerous power given by the 
Constitution to Congress” as one of his principal reasons for 
refusing to sign.89 I shall come back to the point later. 
   4) The “Deep South” Provisions 
Most strikingly, Document IV, as part of its enumeration of 
powers, inserted three provisions entirely for the benefit of the 
South, and especially the deep South.90 These provisions were to 
cause considerable controversy when they were debated in 
August; and they had not been discussed in Convention before 
the meeting of the Committee of Detail. How were they 
introduced and by whom? 
Here it is helpful to have a sense of the physical appearance 
of the manuscript. It consists of nine pages, written on five 
physical sheets. The first eight pages are written on the recto and 
verso sides; the final page on the recto side of a sheet of its own.91 
On the first four pages there are three or four slight 
interventions in the hand of Rutledge. Then, on page five, when 
the powers of Congress are enumerated, and for two pages 
thereafter, his interventions are frequent and conspicuous; and 
the “deep South” passages are among those Rutledge most 
heavily edited. 
From the fact that he presented the final report to the 
Convention and that his annotations are found on several of the 
 
 89. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 631 (September 15). Randolph’s 
other major comments on enumeration occur at 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, 
at 53; 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26, 488–89, 563–64. I note that his 
September 15 opposition is likely not to the enumeration of powers itself, but to the 
Necessary and Proper Clause, which he opposed. Id. at 563 (September 10) (“Mr. 
Randolph took this opportunity to state his objections to the System. They turned . . . on 
the general clause concerning necessary and proper laws . . . .”). See infra text 
accompanying notes 175–207. 
 90. These controversial provisions occur on Randolph’s fifth sheet. 2 CONVENTION 
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 143; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 273. 
 91. The pages have been numbered in pencil at the top of the page, presumably by 
an archivist at the Library of Congress. As discussed below (infra note 127 and 
accompanying text), the final sheet could arguably also be assigned to the beginning; but 
this subtlety is irrelevant to the present discussion.  
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drafts, Rutledge is generally assumed to have been the chairman 
of the committee and to have presided over its sessions. It is also 
generally assumed (no doubt correctly) that he was centrally 
involved in the “deep South” passages. He was himself a con-
siderable slaveowner and vigorously defended the interests of 
the slave states in the Convention debates; moreover, as the 
Committee member from South Carolina, he undoubtedly 
reminded his colleagues that General Pinckney had threatened 
to vote against any report that did not protect slavery. From 
these various facts it has often been concluded that Rutledge 
dominated the proceedings and even that he “hijacked the 
Constitution.”92 But the documents tell a more complex story. 
Document IV contains three “deep South” provisions. The 
first prohibits Congress from taxing exports. This clause appears 
in Randolph’s hand, immediately after the clause granting 
Congress the power to tax. Next to this restriction, Rutledge has 
written “agrd.”; but whether the agreeing was by Rutledge or by 
the full Committee is impossible to say. This issue had received 
little attention in the opening weeks of the Convention.93 But on 
July 12 General Pinckney argued that, if South Carolina’s slaves 
were not to count fully towards representation in Congress, then 
the fruits of their labor—i.e. exports—should not be taxed;94 and 
when the Committee of Detail was appointed he bluntly 
announced that he would vote against any report that did not 
prohibit such taxes.95 The delegations from the deep South were 
solidly on his side; Virginia was split, with Madison opposing 
him, and Mason in favor.96 Randolph appears to have agreed (or 
at least to have thought it necessary to accommodate him); and a 
few lines below “No taxes on exports,” he repeats the point and 
writes, “no Duty on exports.” Rutledge then inserts a further 
prohibition: “no State to lay a duty on imports.” This, too, would 
prevent the northern states from imposing a duty on southern 
goods. 
Secondly, Randolph added a further provision that had so 
far not even been mentioned: a requirement that any navigation 
 
 92. See STEWART, supra note 45 and accompanying text. 
 93. I note in passing that both Hamilton and Gouverneur Morris appear to have 
assumed that export taxes would be permitted. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 
2, at 286, 592. 
 94. Id. at 592 (July 12). 
 95. Supra note 14 and accompanying text. 
 96. For the deep South, see 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 307 (giving 
the views of Hugh Williamson); see also id. at 374 (giving the views of Pierce Butler); id. 
at 306–07 (giving the views of Madison); id. at 305–06 (giving the views of Mason). 
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act (i.e., any act regulating imports and exports) be passed by a 
supermajority of each chamber of the legislature. The evident 
fear was that the northern states (who dominated the shipping 
industry) would use navigation acts to the disadvantage of 
southern exporters: the supermajority requirement would ward 
off that particular threat.97 This navigation act provision appears 
to have been a particular hobbyhorse of Randolph’s. At any 
rate, as late as August 29—even after the delegation from South 
Carolina had thrown in the towel—he was still hotly arguing the 
point.98 Wilson, in contrast, explicitly opposed this supermajority 
requirement, as he opposed supermajority requirements 
generally.99 Indeed, in this one instance Rutledge intervenes 
actually to reduce Randolph’s supermajority requirement.100 We 
may infer that Randolph introduced it into the draft on his own 
initiative. 
The third provision, connected to the other two, was brief. 
In his original formulation, Randolph had written, “no 
prohibitions on Importations of inhabitants. no duties by way of 
such prohibition.” This was of course a veiled reference to the 
slave trade. Rutledge intervened to make the prohibition more 
explicit, interlineating and changing the first clause as follows: 
“no prohibition on such ^ye^ Importations of ^such^ 
inhabitants ^or People as the sevl. States think proper to 
admit^.”101 This provision, too, had not previously been 
discussed in the Convention, and was a major concession to the 
interests of the deep South. It also raises a perplexing question 
about Randolph. When, on August 22, a version of the slave 
clause he himself had drafted was debated in Convention, 
Randolph actually opposed it, and sought a compromise: 
He dwelt on the dilemma to which the Convention was 
exposed. By agreeing to the clause, it would revolt the 
Quakers, the Methodists, and many others in the States 
having no slaves. On the other hand, two States [i.e. South 
Carolina and Georgia] might be lost to the Union.102 
 
 97. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 449–52. 
 98. See id. at 452–53 (“Mr. Randolph said that there were features so odious in the 
Constitution as it now stands, that he doubted whether he should be able to agree to it.”). 
 99. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 451. 
 100. Randolph had originally required an affirmative vote of 11 states; Rutledge 
changed this to two-thirds. 
 101. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 143; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 273. (The words between carats are interlineations in Rutledge’s hand.) 
 102. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 374. 
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Not himself a plantation owner, he had no great personal stake 
in the survival of slavery; and this makes it somewhat curious 
that the slavery provision should first arise in his handwriting. 
Perhaps, in the wake of subsequent controversy, he revised his 
position; or perhaps he originally inserted the provision in 
response to pressure from the South Carolinians. We do not 
know. 
I shall return later to these three “deep South” provisions 
and their implications for the internal dynamics of the 
Committee. For now, I merely note that the principal elements 
all make their first appearance in the handwriting of Randolph; 
and that, although Rutledge intervened to adjust the language, 
he did not greatly alter the substance. 
So far, we have seen that Document IV, far from simply 
“tidying up” the work of the Convention, has introduced several 
far-reaching changes to the powers of the legislature. Contrary 
to the view that Rutledge “hijacked the Constitution,” the pro-
slavery provisions make their first appearance in the handwriting 
of Randolph. And, contrary to the view that Wilson dominated 
the proceedings, none of the changes so far can be ascribed to 
his agency.  
There is here a more general question. Is the initial 
Randolph draft his own handiwork or the product of Committee 
debate? Are the Rutledge annotations to be interpreted as the 
views of Rutledge or were they added in the course of 
Committee discussions? I shall return to these questions after we 
have proceeded through the entire document; for now, I merely 
note the importance of not leaping from the handwriting to 
conclusions about ultimate authorship. 
  b. The Executive 
The treatment of the presidency in the Randolph draft is 
subtle and requires close attention.103 We can begin by noticing 
the views of the committee members as expressed in the general 
debates. Both Randolph and Rutledge were hostile to a strong 
executive. Although Rutledge supported Wilson’s proposal for a 
single executive, he did not wish the president to appoint 
members of the judiciary, and he vigorously argued that he be 
elected by the legislature.104 Randolph was even more skeptical, 
 
 103. I have been helped here by the superb study, THACH, supra note 52, at 105–39, 
which devotes its fifth chapter principally to the Committee of Detail. 
 104. See 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 65 (June 1) (supporting Wilson 
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wishing to limit the executive to a single term, and denouncing 
Wilson’s single executive as “the foetus of monarchy.”105 (He 
preferred a three-member executive.) Gorham is somewhat 
opaque. He did not speak often enough on the topic for his 
views to be ascertained; but he, too, favored senatorial rather 
than presidential appointment of the judiciary.106 Finally, 
Ellsworth supported the selection of the president by an 
electoral college (rendering him independent of the legislature); 
but he, like the other four, favored senatorial appointment of the 
judiciary.107 Thus on the topic of the executive Wilson was 
isolated. 
The treatment of the executive in Document IV cannot be 
considered independently of the treatment of the Senate. 
Roughly speaking, in the Convention at this stage of the 
proceedings there were two primary conceptions of executive 
authority, which we can call the senatorial and the presidential. 
On the first conception, the senate would wield many 
traditionally executive functions: appointing ambassadors; 
appointing judges and other officers; negotiating and ratifying 
treaties; and (somewhat like the Senate in ancient Rome) 
providing extensive advice (which the President, being elected 
by the legislature, would be hard pressed to reject). The 
presidential conception, in contrast, would lodge most of these 
powers in the chief executive. 
Randolph’s draft goes as far as he could go in the direction 
of a senatorial presidency without actually ignoring altogether 
the resolutions voted by the Convention. He introduces new 
powers over treaties and ambassadors and consigns them 
exclusively to the Senate; he adds no important powers to the 
presidency (except the power to receive ambassadors). In 
Rutledge’s handwriting are added a few points—chiefly the 
pardon power, and a clearer designation of the president as 
“Commander-in-Chief of the Land & Naval Forces.” And there 
is one subtle matter. Rutledge’s remarks first provided that the 
 
on single executive); id. at 119 (June 5) (opposing Wilson on appointment of judges by 
the executive); 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 57 (July 19) (opposing all 
modes of electing the executive except by the legislature). 
 105. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 66 (June 1). Randolph’s principal 
other remarks on the executive are at 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 43 (July 
18) (favoring appointment of judges by the Senate), and at 54–55 (July 19) (supporting 
Luther Martin’s motion to limit the executive to a single term). 
 106. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 41 (July 18). 
 107. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 57 (July 19) (favoring electoral 
college); id. at 81 (July 21) (favoring senatorial appointment of the judiciary). 
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president be elected by a joint ballot of the legislature, which 
would give the large states, with their greater representation in 
the lower house, an advantage; he then changed the provision so 
that each house would vote separately. What explains the 
change? It is impossible to be certain; but in this instance it is 
reasonable to conjecture that his insertions were made during a 
Committee meeting and that the change was in response to an 
objection raised (presumably by Ellsworth) on behalf of the 
small states. 
We do not know; but the essential point is that Rutledge 
essentially leaves Randolph’s senatorial scheme intact. We shall 
need to watch the sequence of drafts for alterations as they pass 
through Wilson’s hands: he had a special interest in the 
presidency, and this is one of the areas in which his influence on 
the Committee appears to have been greatest. 
  c. The Judiciary 
Madison’s original Virginia Plan had said little about the 
national judiciary. It had provided for a supreme court and for 
inferior courts; for judicial tenure during good behavior; and for 
no reduction in salaries.108 These elements made their way, 
slightly modified, into the Convention resolutions, and were 
copied more-or-less verbatim by Randolph into Document IV.109 
The same is not true for the provisions concerning 
jurisdiction of the national courts. The Virginia Plan provided 
for jurisdiction over: piracies and felonies on the high seas; 
“captures from an enemy”; “cases in which foreigners or citizens 
of other States applying to such jurisdictions may be interested”; 
cases involving the collection of the national revenue; impeach-
ments of national officers; and “questions which may involve the 
national peace and harmony.”110 The Convention resolutions had 
been even briefer: “Resolved[.] That the Jurisdiction of the 
national Judiciary shall extend to Cases arising under the Laws 
passed by the general Legislature, and to such other Questions 
as involve the national Peace and Harmony.”111 
 
 108. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 20–23 (May 29). 
 109. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 146–47; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 279. 
 110. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 22 (May 29). 
 111. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132–33; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 245. 
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The Randolph Draft adds considerable detail. The bulk of 
the passage is in Randolph’s hand. (The clauses in carats are 
marginal insertions in the hand of Rutledge, to which I shall 
return when discussing Draft IX. I omit the numerous check 
marks in Wilson’s hand.)— 
7. The jurisdiction of the supreme tribunal shall extend 
1. to all cases, arising under laws, passed by the general; 
^Legislature:^ 
2. to impeachments of officers: and 
3. to ^such^ other cases, as the national legislature may 
assign, as involving the national peace and harmony, in 
the collection of the revenue, in disputes between citizens 
of different states, ^in disputes between a State & a 
Citizen or Citizens of another State^ in disputes between 
different states; and in disputes, in which subjects or 
citizens of other countries are concerned ^& in Cases of 
Admiralty Jurisdn^ 
But this supreme jurisdiction shall be appellate only, 
except in ^Cases of Impeachment & in^ those instances, 
in which the legislature shall make it original. and the 
legislature. shall organize it. 
8. The whole or a part of the jurisdiction aforesaid. according 
to the discretion of the legislature. may be assigned to the 
inferior tribunals, as original tribunals.112 
Subsequent drafts added refinements; but here, for the first time, 
we have a recognizable delineation of the jurisdiction of the 
federal courts. In certain respects, this section is even more of an 
innovation than the enumeration of legislative powers, for most 
of those powers were already present in the Articles of 
Confederation. But this grant of jurisdiction is a clear expansion 
of the federal judicial power, going well beyond what Madison’s 
Notes relate as having been discussed in Convention. The 
expansion is all the more remarkable when one recalls with what 
difficulty the delegates were persuaded to allow the creation of 
federal courts. I note that virtually the entire passage is in 
Randolph’s handwriting. 
One further point is worthwhile to mention. It has a bearing 
also on the enumeration of powers and the Necessary and 
 
 112. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 146–47; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 279. (I have corrected some errors of transcription in Farrand.) 
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Proper Clause (to which I shall come in due course). Madison’s 
Notes for June 13 show Randolph (seconded by Madison) 
proposing the brief and highly general language specifying the 
jurisdiction of the national courts that eventually became the 
Convention resolution quoted above.113 From the account in 
Madison (and from the Convention resolutions themselves) one 
might conclude that this was language intended to be 
incorporated into the final text of the Constitution. But the notes 
of Yates for that day give a fuller account of Randolph’s (and 
the Convention’s) reasoning: 
Gov. Randolph observed the difficulty in establishing the 
powers of the judiciary—the object however at present is to 
establish this principle, to wit, the security of foreigners when 
treaties are in their favor, and to preserve the harmony of 
states and that of the citizens thereof. This being once 
established, it will be the business of a sub-committee to detail 
it; and therefore moved to obliterate such parts of the 
[original Virginia] resolve so as only to establish the principle, 
to wit, that the jurisdiction of the national judiciary shall extend 
to all cases of national revenue, impeachment of national 
officers, and questions which involve the national peace and 
harmony.114 
In other words, Randolph’s proposed language (which passed 
unanimously) was explicitly put forward as a place-holder, with 
the details to be filled in; and it was Randolph who did the filling 
in. This major segment of the Constitution appears to be his own 
handiwork. 
  d. Miscellaneous Provisions (and Bills of Rights) 
The Randolph Draft also contains several other matters—
filling in details on the admission of new states, guaranteeing to 
the states a republican form of government, specifying an 
amendment process. It outlines a process for ratification of the 
Constitution, and, for the first time, allowed for a less-than-
unanimous ratification by the states, although it left blank the 
exact number. In the main, on these points, Document IV does 
what was expected, and merely fills in details, broadly in the 
 
 113. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 232. 
 114. Id. at 238. The Yates notes need to be handled with caution, since they were 
later doctored by “Citizen Genet”; id. at xiv–xv. But other documents point in the same 
direction, and I take this passage to be reliable as a report of Randolph’s reasoning. As 
we shall see, this is not the only place where the language of the Convention resolutions 
may have been intended to serve as a place-holder. 
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spirit of the Convention resolutions and the Articles of 
Confederation. There is also a more surprising marginal 
insertion—this time in Rutledge’s hand, but then deleted—
providing that state laws repugnant to the Constitution were to 
be treated as void, and were not to be followed by the national 
judiciary.115 There are subtle matters here, regarding the way in 
which these various issues were handled in the successive drafts; 
but I shall leave them to one side. There is a much more 
significant issue to consider. 
So far, I have been discussing the portions of Randolph’s 
draft that deal with what was then called “the frame of 
government.” But what about the other half of the duplex 
structure inherited from George Mason: a declaration of rights? 
Ordinarily, such a declaration would appear at the beginning of 
the document; and Randolph in fact begins Document IV with 
some important remarks about constitutions in general. He 
stresses the need for the Constitution to be flexible, and 
therefore to contain “essential principles only, lest the 
operations of government should be clogged by rendering those 
provisions permanent and unalterable, which ought to be 
accommodated to times and events[.]”116 This comment is 
followed by the admonition “To use simple and precise 
language,” and then by an important paragraph on the nature of 
a preamble. 
“A preamble,” he says, “seems proper.”117 But then he 
immediately issues a qualification. Preambles, he says, are 
 
 115. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 277. (“All laws of a particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void: and 
in the decision therein, which shall be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents 
without which the general principles cannot be satisfied, shall be considered, as involved 
in the general principle.” Some slips in Farrand’s transcription have here been 
corrected.) This was evidently an attempt to formulate the Supremacy Clause required 
by the Convention resolutions. I note in passing the awkwardness of the formulation, 
which is characteristic of Rutledge—and which provides at least a minor indication that 
Wilson, a far better draftsman, was not involved in the Randolph draft. 
 116. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 137; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 265. It would be rash to attempt to claim Randolph on the basis of these 
remarks as an advocate of a “living Constitution.” In the first place, his remarks explicitly 
recognize the existence of “permanent and unalterable” principles. But, more 
importantly, the philosophical framework of the modern debate over originalism simply 
did not exist in the 18th century, and to try to squeeze Randolph into the modern 
conceptual categories is to risk severe anachronism. 
 117. Id. Farrand has mis-transcribed this passage. It reads (all deletions and 
interlineations are in Randolph’s hand): 
A preamble seems proper. Not for the purpose of designating the ends of 
government and human polities—This business, if not fitter for the schools, is at 
least sufficiently executed display of theory, howsoever proper in the first 
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proper in the constitutions of the states for two purposes: first, 
for designating the ends of government and human polities; 
second, for presenting “the natural rights of man not yet 
gathered into society.” But in the present Constitution such a 
“display of theory” is unnecessary (“fitter for the schools” he 
says in a cancelled passage). The matter has been “sufficiently 
executed” in the state constitutions. We are now dealing with 
men who have already entered into society, and whose rights are 
“interwoven with . . . the rights of states.”118 
It is customary to speak of the opening words of the U.S. 
Constitution as the “preamble.” But that is our language, not the 
language of the document itself. In any case, Randolph’s 
rejection of preambles is itself longer than the “preamble” we 
now have. It is important to understand that he is employing the 
term in a broader and an older sense, in the manner of some of 
the state constitutions—to designate (as he says) a statement of 
the rights of man, and the fundamental ends of government. 
These matters are more commonly referred to, in Mason’s 
language, as a declaration or bill of rights. 
Why does Randolph wish to avoid commencing the 
Constitution with a bill of rights? The answer, as with so much 
else in this draft, is likely connected to slavery and also to 
George Mason. In 1776, when Mason wrote the Virginia 
Declaration, Edmund Randolph was a member of the drafting 
committee. He seems to have played no active role. He was at 
the time 22 years old; Mason was 50. But Randolph observed 
Mason’s handiwork closely, and it left a lasting impression. In his 
History of Virginia, written more than thirty years later, 
Randolph recalled the significance of Mason’s work and also the 
duplex structure of the Virginia Constitution: 
In the formation of this bill of rights two objects were 
contemplated: one, that the legislature should not in their acts 
violate any of those canons [specified in the bill]; the other, 
that in all the revolutions of time, of human opinion, and of 
government, a perpetual standard should be erected, around 
which the people might rally and by a notorious record be 
forever admonished to be watchful, firm, and virtuous. 
 
formation of state governments, seems ^is^ unfit here; since we are not working 
on the natural rights ^of men^ not yet gathered into society, but upon those 
rights, modified by society, and supporting ^interwoven with^ what we call 
states the rights of states. 
For a reproduction of the original, see COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 264. 
 118. I am reading the cancelled “sufficiently executed” as having originally been 
intended to refer to the “state governments” later in the sentence. 
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  The cornerstone being thus laid, a constitution delegating 
portions of power to different organs under certain 
modifications was of course to be raised upon it.119 
Randolph in 1787 no doubt painfully recalled what had 
happened to Mason’s bill of rights during the Virginia debate of 
1776. Mason’s draft had declared 
That all Men are born equally free and independant [sic], and 
have certain inherent natural Rights, of which they cannot by 
any Compact, deprive or divest their Posterity; among which 
are the Enjoyment of Life and Liberty, with the Means of 
acquiring and possessing Property, and pursueing [sic] and 
obtaining Happiness and Safety.120 
The Virginia Convention balked at this language, on the grounds 
that it was not compatible with a slaveholding society.121 They 
changed “are born equally free” to “are by nature equally free,” 
and “inherent natural rights” to “inherent rights.”122 The issue, in 
the midst of a revolution, consumed five days of debate, until 
Edmund Pendleton proposed the insertion of the phrase in 
brackets: 
That all men are by nature equally free and independent, and 
have certain inherent rights, of which, <when they enter into a 
state of society,> they cannot, by any compact, deprive or 
divest their posterity; . . . .123 
Randolph now dismisses all such formulations about rights and 
nature and society as “fitter for the schools” than for a 
Constitution. No doubt he wished to avoid a repetition of the 
debates that had convulsed the Virginia Convention, and no 
doubt he wished to keep at bay the intractable issue of slavery. 
This is the likeliest explanation for his opposition to opening the 
Constitution with a bill of rights.124 
 
 119. RANDOLPH, supra note 61. 
 120. 1 MASON PAPERS, supra note 62, at 277. 
 121.  For a full discussion, see the excellent headnote to Mason’s draft, id. at 289–91. 
See also BROADWATER, supra note 62, at 84. Randolph himself explicitly noted the 
connection to slavery in his History of Virginia. RANDOLPH, supra note 61, at 253. 
 122. 1 MASON PAPERS, supra note 62, at 289. 
 123.  Id. at 287. See also BROADWATER, supra note 62, at 84. 
 124. I note in passing—an important point, apparently first pointed out by Akhil 
Amar—that the use of the expression “Bill of Rights” to designate the first ten 
amendments to the Constitution is in fact a twentieth-century coinage. The intellectual 
history here is complex. For an overview, see MAIER, supra note 59, at 459–68. 
It should also be observed that, at the time of the Convention, the New England 
states and Pennsylvania had all begun the process that would eventually lead to abolition; 
Vermont and Massachusetts did so in reliance on their respective bills of rights. This fact, 
and the fact that he was serving on a Committee with three delegates from states that had 
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Randolph goes on to say that, in his view, a preamble ought 
“briefly to represent declare, that the present federal 
government is insufficient to the general happiness; that the 
conviction of this fact gave birth to this convention; and that the 
only effectual meansode which they couldan devise, for curing 
this insufficiency, is the establishment of a supreme legislative 
executive and judiciary.”125 
The issue raised by this remark was evidently a point of 
particular sensitivity for Randolph. By proposing the Virginia 
Plan, he had arguably acted ultra vires, exceeding the 
Convention’s mandate to amend the Articles of Confederation: 
the charge was frequently made, then and since. Document IV 
contains, on the last of its five sheets, a discursive passage in 
which he returns to the point. He suggests that an attempt be 
made to explain to the people the purpose of the document—to 
set forth the defects of the Confederation, to show that a reform 
of the existing system cannot solve the problems, and to present 
the Constitution as the best remedy. He was clearly looking to a 
national audience: “[W]e ought,” he says, “to furnish the 
advocates ^of the plan^ in the country with some general 
topics.”126 Farrand prints this detached sheet as the conclusion to 
the Randolph Draft. Perhaps it was intended as a conclusion; 
but, in view of Randolph’s earlier remarks, it seems equally 
likely that it was intended either as an elaboration of his remarks 
on a preamble, or perhaps as an early sketch for an address of 
the sort that eventually accompanied the Constitution to 
Congress, explaining the actions of the Convention.127 These 
 
already begun the process of abolition, may provide a further explanation for Randolph’s 
skittishness about including a bill of rights. I owe the observation to John Mikhail.  
 125. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 265. 
 126. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 150; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 285. 
 127. Randolph had contemplated the possibility of “an address to accompany the 
new constitution” as early as his letter to Madison of March 27, 1787. 9 MADISON 
PAPERS, supra note 56, at 335. (I owe the point to Mary Bilder.) The first four sheets of 
Randolph’s draft are written on both sides, giving eight pages. Most, though not all, 
contain annotations by Rutledge. None is numbered by Randolph; somebody 
(presumably an archivist at the Library of Congress) has penciled in page numbers. The 
fifth sheet is somewhat tidier, contains no remarks by Rutledge, and is written on a single 
side. It is on similar paper to the other sheets; all five sheets were found together in the 
papers of George Mason. But internally there is nothing to link Randolph’s fifth sheet 
conclusively to the others. It begins, “The object of an address is to satisfy the people of 
the propriety of the proposed reform.” By “address” here Randolph plainly does not 
mean a speech, but a formal, written address of the sort that was discussed in Convention 
on September 10, 12, and 15. See 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 564, 582, 
621–23. Such an address was sent to Congress, over Washington’s signature, on 
September 17, and in fact makes many of the same points as Randolph’s fifth page. Id. at 
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points are not resolvable; but it is clear that the issue of 
ratification already weighed on Randolph as he prepared his 
draft. 
 5. Authorship of the Draft 
What are we to make of this draft as a whole? It is a com-
plicated document and contains many important innovations. So 
that raises the question: Who wrote it? Because Farrand prints it 
as Document IV of the Committee of Detail, and because it 
contains markings in the handwriting of John Rutledge, it is 
usually treated as a product of the Committee’s deliberations. 
For instance, Clinton Rossiter says that the Committee first met 
and “rummage[d]” to gather materials that might be useful to 
their purposes.128 (This is wrong: the Convention itself furnished 
the Committee with copies of the Convention resolutions and 
with copies of the Pinckney and New Jersey plans). Then, “while 
the others looked over his shoulder, Randolph wrote out the 
rough draft of a constitution.”129 This is an invention. William 
Meigs, in contrast, who first studied Document IV, treats it 
instead as the work of Randolph.130 The point is debatable, but I 
believe that, on the balance of the evidence, Meigs’s view is 
correct. 
To see why, let us begin by considering the portion of the 
draft that is in Randolph’s handwriting and then turn to the 
Rutledge additions. In the first place, Randolph’s introductory 
reflections on preambles; his admonition to use simple language; 
his recommendations at the end about the strategy of 
ratification; his use of “I” in the very last sentence—these things 
hardly seem compatible with a report of a document drafted by a 
 
666–67. However, because by September Randolph had decided not to sign the 
Constitution, his sheet cannot date from that episode, but from earlier in the 
proceedings—most likely from the time of the Committee of Detail, though the fact is 
not absolutely certain. That leaves open the question of the precise sequencing of the 
fifth sheet. Since Randolph, on his first page, states that the conclusion to the 
Constitution should contain a solemn pledge of the parties to observe the new document, 
and since his fifth sheet is a direct elaboration of his remarks on preambles, it probably 
belongs more properly to the beginning of the document than to its end—though it may 
be that he was undecided whether the better vehicle for communicating his points was a 
preamble or a separate address to the people.  
 128. ROSSITER, supra note32, at 201. 
 129. Id. at 201–02 (“After the Randolph draft had been discussed point by point, and 
the chairman had introduced various modifications in his own hand, the fourth and most 
decisive stage was taken over by the most learned, experienced, and dedicated member 
of the committee, James Wilson.”). 
 130. MEIGS, supra note 21, at 324.  
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committee. Secondly, in terms of the constitutional content of 
the draft, almost all the important innovations correspond to 
Randolph’s own firm beliefs, as expressed in the Convention—
the distrust of a strong executive, the conception of a powerful 
senate, the strong desire for an enumeration of legislative 
powers. Randolph was a sophisticated lawyer and certainly 
capable of drafting by himself the passages on the jurisdiction of 
the federal courts. The exact nuances of his views on slavery are 
hard to pin down; but at the least he believed that the “deep 
South” provisions were necessary to placate South Carolina. 
There is moreover no direct evidence that any other committee 
member contributed any of these innovations. 
Procedurally, too, Randolph’s authorship would make 
sense. The Committee’s formal assignment was to revise the 
original Randolph proposals of May 29. What could have been 
more appropriate than to ask the distinguished Governor of 
Virginia to begin the process? And there is another small clue. 
At the beginning of his draft, at the end of his discussion of 
preambles, after a passage discussing the need to explain the 
decision to abandon the Articles of Confederation, he wrote 
(and then deleted) “In this manner we may discharge the first 
resolution.” But the first of the Convention resolutions deals 
with the tripartite structure of the national government; it says 
nothing about amending the Articles. Randolph is instead 
referring back to the first resolution of his own Virginia Plan.131 
Later in the manuscript, however, he takes passages from the 
Convention resolutions almost verbatim. This suggests that, at 
the time he began to write his draft, the Convention resolutions 
had not yet been prepared for the use of the Committee. And 
indeed, if we look closely, we see that, as soon as the Committee 
was appointed, Randolph, up to that point a regular participant 
in the Convention debates, delivers no speeches; and after one 
critical vote, Madison noted that the Virginia delegation split 2-2 
because “Mr. Randolph happened to be out of the House.”132 
This is suggestive. Remember that Mason in 1776 had gone to 
work on his own and had essentially drafted both the Virginia 
Declaration of Rights and the Virginia Constitution from his 
room in the Raleigh Tavern. Randolph, as we saw, was 
 
 131.  “Resolved that the articles of Confederation ought to be so corrected & 
enlarged as to accomplish the objects proposed by their institution; namely “common 
defence, security of liberty and general welfare.” 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 
2, at 20 (May 29). 
 132. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 121 (July 26). 
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thoroughly familiar with this precedent. On balance, therefore 
(and certainty is not to be had) I am inclined to believe that, as 
soon as the Committee was appointed on Tuesday, July 24, 
Randolph either decided to emulate Mason’s example or was 
asked (as the sponsor of the Randolph plan) to prepare a first 
draft; in either case, he absented himself from the Convention in 
the days before the Committee first met. On July 25 the 
Convention voted to supply the Committee with a copy of the 
Convention resolutions. This would explain the discrepancies in 
his opening paragraphs. 
The Rutledge marginalia present a somewhat harder 
problem. His handwriting appears on the Randolph draft and on 
the last of the Wilson drafts; this is compatible with his having 
presided over Committee meetings in which the drafts were 
discussed. There are also small indications (like the shift from 
joint to separate balloting for the presidency) that may point to a 
committee discussion. On the other hand, most of the changes 
Rutledge makes to the Randolph draft are in keeping with his 
own views and his heaviest interventions are in the slavery and 
navigation provisions, where the interests of South Carolina 
were deeply involved. The possibility cannot be excluded that he 
and Randolph jointly worked out the slavery provisions before 
the Committee first met; certainly both delegates would have 
been acutely aware of General Pinckney’s threats (which had 
been expressed on Monday). The evidence, however, is 
inconclusive. The remaining annotations on this document are 
the numerous check-marks. These are in the hand of Wilson and 
were most likely made in the course of preparing the subsequent 
drafts. 
 6. Conclusions on Document IV 
I have dwelled on Randolph’s draft both for its intrinsic 
importance and because it illustrates something significant about 
the historiography of the Convention. It is difficult to find 
accounts that grant his draft more than a sentence or two. But it 
should now be clear that this is a document of the utmost impor-
tance. It introduces many striking innovations—the enumeration 
of powers, the protection of the slave trade, the rules on exports 
and navigation acts, the granting of appointment powers to the 
Senate, the specification of the jurisdiction of the federal courts. 
Moreover, none of the most widespread theories about the 
Committee of Detail is able to survive even a casual encounter 
with Randolph’s document. The view that the Committee was a 
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mere intermission is plainly untenable. The view that the 
Committee was “a committee of Wilson and four others” is 
equally untenable. Of the major innovations I have just listed, 
Wilson would have opposed all but the last. At this stage there is 
no clear sign of his participation, even on minor matters. And as 
for the theory that Rutledge rather than Wilson dominated (or 
even “hijacked”) the sessions, it is of course true that the 
Committee acted to protect the interests of the deep South; and 
it must be the case that Rutledge was deeply involved.133 But the 
first appearance of the objectionable provisions is in Randolph’s 
hand, not Rutledge’s. 
It is undeniable that Randolph was something of a 
“chameleon,” that he was cantankerous, and that in the end he 
refused to sign the Constitution. Perhaps for these reasons most 
historians place him far down in the rankings of delegates. In his 
most visible role at the Convention, when he opened the 
proceedings by presenting the Virginia Plan, he is generally 
viewed as merely Madison’s mouthpiece. But if the analysis 
given here is correct (and complete certainty is not possible) 
then Randolph produced Document IV largely on his own; and 
this makes him the primary author of the jurisdictional 
provisions of Article III. He more broadly has the honor, not 
only of having presented the Virginia Plan, but also of having 
written the first draft of the Constitution. But it is a very mixed 
honor. His positive contributions, though of fundamental 
 
 133. A similar point holds for Hueston’s thesis of a hijacking by states’ rights 
proponents. Hueston, supra note 36, deserves full credit for seeing the importance of the 
Committee of Detail and for trying to disentangle its contributions to federal-state 
relations. But his execution of this important insight, in my view, has some serious 
limitations. (i) He does not attempt to analyze the individual drafts, or to consider them 
in sequence: and thus he misses much of the story of the internal dynamics of the 
Committee. (Any discussion of these textual matters must start with the scholarly work 
of Jameson and McLaughlin, which he does not mention.) (ii) He lumps together all five 
committee members as “states’ rights” advocates: this is simply incorrect, especially for 
Wilson, but the matter also requires a more nuanced statement for the others. More 
broadly, he does not attempt to tack back-and-forth between the Committee and the 
statements of its members in Convention in order to try to work out the individual 
contributions; as a result, he misses the subtle and important differences between them. 
The fact that most of the drafts are in Wilson’s handwriting is mentioned in passing, but 
its importance not appreciated; Randolph’s draft and the Pinckney Plan are not explicitly 
analyzed; he misses the contributions of Randolph to the drafting of what would become 
Article III. (iii) He overstates his conclusions; in particular, it is not clear that “a strong[] 
national model”—in particular, one without enumerated powers—was “the first choice 
of the Convention as a whole.” Id. at 782. On the contrary, even the two strongest 
nationalists at the Convention, Madison and Wilson, appear to have seen some such 
enumeration as inevitable; and many others raised vehement objections to an 
unconstrained grant of legislative power to the national government. See infra, notes 
184–201 and accompanying text. 
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importance, are overshadowed by the provisions on slavery. 
Moreover, he had the opportunity to follow the precedent of the 
state constitutions, and to begin the national Constitution with a 
“preamble,” i.e. a Bill of Rights. That would have been no 
radical step; and, as Mason subsequently pointed out to the 
Convention, the job could have been accomplished “in a few 
hours.”134 But Randolph consciously chose a different course: a 
decision that nearly derailed the ratification of the Constitution. 
Ironically, he and Mason both refused to sign the final 
document: and Mason’s refusal was in large measure based on 
the absence of a Bill of Rights. It is these facts that give the 
unexplained presence of Randolph’s draft among Mason’s 
papers a certain poignancy. 
D. DOCUMENT V 
We now come to the Wilson drafts, which make up the rest 
of the surviving documents from the Committee of Detail. (Of 
all the Committee documents, only the Randolph draft is not in 
Wilson’s handwriting.) The next document is numbered by 
Farrand as “Document V.” This is misleading. It is in fact 
written on two different sheets of paper, which are located in 
distinct parts of the Wilson archive: Farrand has spliced them 
together to create a single document.135 
Wilson’s normal practice in preparing the Committee drafts 
was to begin with a large folio sheet, which he folded in half 
across its width. This gave him a signature of four pages; 
frequently he would write only on the right half of the page, 
allowing ample room for subsequent additions. His two full 
drafts of the Constitution consist each of several such signatures. 
In this instance, he began writing on the outside front page of 
the signature, leaving the left-hand side of the page blank. There 
are numerous insertions and re-writings. The page (cleaned up, 
with some deletions and false starts omitted) began as follows: 
The People of the States of New Hampshire &C, ^already 
confederated united and known by the Stile of the “United 
 
 134. See supra note 79, at 587–88 (Sept. 12) (quoting Mason on the utility and ease of 
adding a Bill of Rights). 
 135. For details, see COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 287, and the 
Addendum, id. at 367. Farrand, as he worked his way through the Wilson manuscripts, 
doubtless saw that the second sheet fit naturally with the first, and printed the two 
together. There is no reason to question his attribution, but it would have been 
preferable if he had somewhere noted that the two sheets of paper are in fact distinct 
both in their appearance and their physical location. 
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States of America”^ do agree upon ordain ^declare^ and 
establish the following Frame of Gov.t as the Constitution of 
the said United States.136 
He then inserted a “We” before “The People.” This is the first 
occurrence of what were to become the famous opening words 
of the Constitution. 
There follow two brief paragraphs dealing with the national 
legislature, whose two chambers he designates (probably 
following the terminology of the Pinckney Plan) as the “House 
of Representatives” and the “Senate.” In the wide margin he 
experiments with the wording. This folio sheet breaks off 
halfway down the page. On both sides of a separate, smaller 
sheet of paper (headed “The Continuation of the Scheme”) he 
lists the topics remaining to be treated. The ordering is the usual 
one: legislature—executive—judiciary—miscellaneous. The 
sheet is a mere laundry list; no details are given. 
The two sheets are only a sketch, and have the look of 
something prepared by Wilson for his own purposes, possibly in 
the days before the Committee first met. There is no sign of 
contributions from other members of the Committee and there 
is also no sign that he had seen the Randolph draft. The first 
sheet contains a property requirement for the House of 
Representatives (of 50 acres of land). Whether this was to be a 
restriction on the voters or on the candidates is not clear. The 
provision is difficult to reconcile with Wilson’s general position 
against limitations on the franchise; but Wilson here would have 
been constrained by the explicit instructions of the 
Convention.137 
From today’s perspective, the most interesting part of the 
document is the opening words. Wilson explicitly grounds the 
Constitution in the people of the states, rather than in the states 
themselves. The idea of popular sovereignty was central to 
Wilson—more central, perhaps, to Wilson than to any other 
delegate and certainly more than to any other member of the 
Committee of Detail.138 There is a subtle ambiguity in his 
formula, “We the People of the States of New Hampshire &c.” 
Is this People a single collectivity (i.e. the totality of inhabitants 
of these thirteen states)? Or is it instead thirteen separate 
 
 136. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 289. The transcription of these 
heavily re-written sentences in Farrand is opaque.  
 137. See supra text accompanying notes 79–81. 
 138. See Ewald, supra note 42, passim. 
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collectivities? There is no question about Wilson’s own view, and 
the formulation “We the People of the United States” would 
have been closer to his actual position. But at this stage of the 
proceedings it would have been pressing matters to omit the 
states altogether. And perhaps he already foresaw that, unless 
ratification by the states was to be unanimous, his formula would 
need to be changed. 
E. DRAFT VI/VIII 
 1. General Remarks 
The documents Farrand labels VI, VII, and VIII need to be 
treated as a unit. Draft VI/VIII (as I shall designate it) is a 
proper draft of a Constitution—the second after Randolph’s, 
and the first clearly produced by the Committee. It is in Wilson’s 
hand and incorporates elements both from the Randolph draft 
and from the earlier Wilson sketch. Unfortunately it is not 
complete. It originally consisted of three folio sheets, each 
folded into a four-page signature. But the middle signature has 
disappeared. 
We are thus left with three pieces. Document VI is the first 
signature. It consists of four pages and deals principally with the 
composition and election of the House of Representatives and 
Senate. Document VIII is the third signature; it deals primarily 
with the “miscellaneous” category of topics—ratification, amend-
ments, and the like. It has one curious feature. The first sheet of 
Wilson’s Document V filled only the front half-page of a four-
page signature. The thrifty Wilson flipped the signature over to 
begin writing Document VIII. This has the consequence that the 
first version of “We the People” in Document V appears upside-
down on the last page of Document VIII. 
The missing middle signature would have contained, on four 
pages, the enumeration of congressional powers, as well as the 
treatment of the presidency and the judicial branch. In the 
Wilson archive, placed between the first and the third signatures, 
was a further document, also written in Wilson’s hand. This 
document (Document VII) Jameson identified as a set of 
extracts from the New Jersey Plan, followed by a set of extracts 
from the Pinckney Plan. The two sets of excerpts are written 
onto a single four-page folio signature; the passages deal with 
the powers of Congress, and with the executive and judicial 
branches, i.e. precisely the topics that would have been treated 
in the missing signature. It is highly unlikely that any of Wilson’s 
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descendants would have known enough about the workings of 
the Committee of Detail to have expertly placed this sheet 
precisely where Jameson found it, between the two surviving 
sheets of the Committee draft. This suggests that the placement 
was made by Wilson himself, and perhaps that the missing 
middle sheet had already disappeared during his lifetime: but 
there is no way to be sure. 
Draft VI/VIII adopted Wilson’s opening words, originally in 
the form, “We the People and the States of New Hampshire 
&C.” But Wilson altered that formulation back to his original 
(and far more Wilsonian) “We the People of the States.” The 
draft also provides that the new government is to be called the 
“United People and States of America”—also a Wilsonian 
formula, but this time with echoes of the Roman republic.139 
A few general remarks about VI/VIII are in order. The 
entire draft is in Wilson’s hand. There are in particular no 
annotations by Rutledge. Only on the somewhat messy last page 
of the first signature do we find a number of items checked off 
(again, in Wilson’s hand). It is often said that Rutledge served as 
the Committee’s chairman, but the evidence is not conclusive. It 
is true that his name appears first in Madison’s list of the 
members of the Committee and also true that he presented the 
final report to the Convention. But it is not clear from these facts 
that the Convention designated him chairman, or even that such 
a small Committee had a formal presiding officer. His hand-
written interventions occur only on two documents (the 
Randolph draft and the final draft) and these facts are capable of 
any number of explanations. The check marks in particular are 
compatible with Wilson’s having presided over Committee 
discussions, though it is more likely that he made them as he 
compared one draft with another. In any case, Wilson made 
numerous interventions and alterations to this draft. Inspection 
shows that virtually all of them are stylistic—interventions to 
adjust the wording, or to render a provision more clearly, but 
none that changes anything of substance. Although it is possible 
 
 139. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 152. Wilson, like many of the 
delegates, was thoroughly steeped in the history of Rome, and this phrase was clearly 
intended to evoke the ancient formula, Senatus publiusque romanus—“the Senate and 
People of Rome”—abbreviated on coins and public buildings as “SPQR.” Notice that, in 
a Wilsonian twist, Draft VI/VIII inverts the order, and places the People first. This 
formula was however dropped in Draft IX in favor of the “United States of America.” 
Id. at 163. 
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that these editorial changes were made in Committee, it seems 
likelier that they were made by Wilson in private. 
The first and last signatures adopt the substance (and often 
the language) of the Randolph draft, with the additions that 
were made in Rutledge’s hand. They add several new provisions 
that go beyond anything authorized in the Convention 
resolutions, and (as we shall see) with which Wilson clearly 
disagreed. For this reason, the draft can confidently be regarded 
as the work of the Committee and not of Wilson alone. But this 
raises the question of when the draft was produced. The most 
reasonable conjecture is that the Committee met to discuss the 
Randolph draft; that certain changes were voted upon; that 
Wilson was then designated to write the next draft; and that 
VI/VIII is the result. 
Most of the work of this draft consists in a tightening of the 
language, sharpening the formulations of ideas that were already 
present in earlier versions. So we get carefully worded clauses 
guaranteeing to the states a republican form of government and 
specifying procedures for the ratification and subsequent 
amendment of the Constitution.140 The Committee added from 
the Articles of Confederation a cumbersome procedure for 
resolving disputes over territorial boundaries between states, 
and, out of logical sequence at the very end of document VIII, 
inserted a stipulation of the veto power of the President (who is 
here referred to as the “Governor”).141 These last two provisions 
would have been of special interest to Wilson; but the evidence 
does not exist to say whether they were added at his specific 
instigation.142 
 
 140. Id. at 159–60; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 313–14. The 
Convention resolutions had stipulated that ratification was to be by state conventions 
selected for the purpose, but had left open the question of whether ratification need be 
unanimous. The Randolph draft provided for a less-than-unanimous ratification, but left 
the exact number blank, as does the first Wilson draft. Similarly, the Convention 
resolutions had specified only that “Provision ought to be made for the Amendment of 
the Articles of Union, whensoever it shall seem necessary.” 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, 
supra note 2, at 133. The Randolph draft (in Rutledge’s handwriting) provided for 
amendment by a new Convention, to be called by Congress on the application of two-
thirds of the state legislatures. 
 141. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 317. 
 142. His views on the absolute presidential veto were repeatedly expressed during 
the Convention. See, e.g., 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 100; 2 CONVENTION 
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 300. As for the provision concerning territorial boundaries 
and disputes between states, Wilson, unlike the other Committee members, had 
extensive experience in litigating such territorial disputes under the arrangements of the 
Articles; though that fact could just as well have made him hostile to the existing 
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 2. Controversial New Provisions 
None of these various provisions was especially 
controversial, and Wilson likely assented to them all. But Draft 
VI/VIII also added three novel provisions which had not been 
approved by the Convention, and which Wilson would certainly 
have resisted. First, it provided that the States were to specify 
the qualifications of the electors of the lower house, and the 
time, place, and manner of holding elections, subject to 
regulation by Congress.143 Secondly, it granted to Congress the 
power to introduce whatever property qualifications for 
members of either chamber of the national legislature it found 
expedient.144 It retained the Randolph draft’s assignment to the 
Senate of the power to make treaties (as well as the power to 
appoint Justices of the Supreme Court).145 Finally, it provided 
that the salaries of members of both houses of Congress were to 
be set and paid by the state legislatures.146 Wilson might 
reluctantly have accepted the first of these provisions because of 
its inclusion of a congressional override, and the second as 
reflecting the express instructions of the Convention; but the 
other two run contrary to his core principles. 
The final provision is especially significant for the light it 
sheds on the internal workings of the Committee. The 
Convention had in fact earlier voted, on June 12, by a vote of 8-
3, that the wages of members of the lower house should be paid 
out of the national treasury.147 In that discussion, Connecticut 
and South Carolina both voted for payment by the state 
legislatures. On June 26, this time by a margin of 6-5, the 
Convention voted that the upper house as well be paid out of the 
national treasury. Again, Connecticut and South Carolina voted 
 
arrangements. I note in passing that the Committee assigned the power to adjudicate 
such disputes to the Senate, rather than to the legislature as a whole. It is an interesting 
though irresolvable question whether Wilson would have approved this assignment. The 
matter can be argued either way. 
 143. Id. at 153. The Committee in this draft also hesitated between whether the 
qualifications for electors of the national legislature should be the same as for the largest 
house of the state legislature, or whether the states should be allowed to set the 
requirements, subject to a congressional override. Id. at 163–64. 
 144. Id. at 155–56. 
 145. Id. at 155. Randolph had given the Senate the power to appoint the full federal 
judiciary; Wilson’s version (which is written into the margin of his draft) thus represents 
a return to the position of the Convention resolutions, which had given the Senate the 
power to appoint the Supreme Court only. 
 146. Id. at 156. Oddly, Rutledge’s Draft IV had originally provided that the wages of 
Senators should be paid out of the national treasury; but he crossed out this provision in 
the draft. Id. at 142. 
 147. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 215–16. 
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on the losing side; and, in this second vote, Oliver Ellsworth both 
introduced and spoke for the losing resolution. Wilson 
vigorously opposed the motion on the grounds that the Senators 
would then be entirely the creatures of the state legislatures.148 In 
the light of this earlier history, it is hard to resist the conclusion 
that Rutledge and Ellsworth seized the opportunity to try to 
reverse their earlier defeats. They must have obtained the 
support of Randolph or Gorham, since this provision survived 
into the final draft presented by the Committee to the 
Convention.149 
 3. Slavery, State Power, and Wilson’s Predicament 
Let us now briefly take stock. Draft VI/VIII is the first draft 
of the Constitution that can confidently be attributed to the 
Committee. The Committee, as instructed, had cleaned up the 
Convention resolutions, and filled in many details in broad 
accordance with its instructions. But it had also added a number 
of provisions of its own, several of which went far beyond or 
even contradicted the earlier votes of the Convention. There is a 
common pattern to these innovations that we must now 
consider. 
The Randolph Draft had sought to limit the reach of the 
national government by adding an explicit enumeration of 
congressional powers. Within the national government itself, 
Randolph (who deeply feared a “monarchical” single executive) 
assigned several important executive powers, and in particular 
powers involving foreign affairs, not to the President, but to the 
Senate. His draft had also sought to safeguard the interests of 
the southern states by adding provisions concerning taxation of 
exports, navigation acts, and the slave trade. And now, in 
VI/VIII, the influence of the states over the national legislature 
has been augmented by several provisions, especially the one 
allowing each state to set the salaries of its representatives. 
Taken together, these innovations represent a large shift of 
power away from the national government and towards the 
states. Wilson might have acquiesced in some of these changes, 
 
 148. Id. at 428–29, 433–34. As Wilson put the point: “In the present case, the states 
may say, although I appoint you for six years, yet if you are against the state, your table 
will be unprovided. Is this the way you are to erect an independent government?” Id. at 
434. (This quotation occurs in the untrustworthy notes by Yates; but here there is no 
reason to suspect any inaccuracy.) These two votes did not make their way into the 
Convention resolutions: presumably this was an error of transcription. 
 149. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 180 (Aug. 6). 
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but the totality must have filled him with foreboding. So we must 
face the questions: How were these changes introduced? Which 
of the committee members supplied the necessary third vote? 
What was Wilson’s situation, and how did he react? 
One very general warning is now in order. As we proceed, it 
is vital to bear in mind the limitations on our knowledge that I 
mentioned at the outset. There is much we do not know; and 
theories that depict the Committee of Detail as engaged in an 
attempt to “hijack” the Constitution are on shaky ground. 
Rutledge and Randolph have manifest character flaws. But they 
were not fools. No doubt, in drafting the Constitution, they 
nudged matters in the direction that they thought best. But is it 
likely that they thought they could engage in a wholesale re-
writing? That they believed nobody would notice? Or could it be 
that it is we who are missing some piece of information? The 
hijack theorists tacitly assume that we have full knowledge of 
what was expected of the Committee. But that is plainly not 
correct. 
Consider, for example, the account of the appointment of 
the Committee as it appears in Madison’s Notes.150 He tells us, 
first, that Elbridge Gerry moved the creation of a Committee to 
draft a Constitution, conformable to the Convention resolutions, 
but not to treat the executive. Then General Pinckney issues his 
threat on the slave trade and navigation acts. Then the 
Convention rejected a Committee of ten members, then of 
seven, before finally settling on five. Gerry’s reservation about 
the executive is never again mentioned: the Notes do not tell us 
what happened to it. One imagines that somebody must have 
said something in response to General Pinckney: again, the Notes 
are silent. Real discussions do not happen like that. Did there 
occur a brief discussion after General Pinckney’s remarks? Was 
it suggested that the Committee come up with a proposal on 
slavery, subject of course to later scrutiny? We do not know. But 
the idea that Rutledge believed he could somehow use the 
Committee to stage a kind of coup d’état is even more 
improbable, and I see no evidence that the Committee was 
engaged in any such enterprise. 
In the absence of detailed documentation, a great deal must 
be conjectured; but certain facts can be stated with confidence. 
In the first place, the provisions concerning slavery and 
navigation acts must have originated from the two Southerners 
 
 150. Id. at 95–96 (July 23). 
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on the Committee, Randolph and Rutledge. That much is clear; 
but there remain a number of puzzles. Randolph himself later in 
the Convention spoke passionately about the need for a 
supermajority for acts regulating commerce151 and also about the 
need to restrict the powers of the central government (which he 
viewed as a threat to the independence of the States).152 But, as 
we saw, during the August 22 debate he spoke against the 
provision safeguarding the slave trade that had emerged from 
the Committee of Detail.153 That clause read (in relevant part): 
“No tax or duty shall be laid by the Legislature . . . on the 
migration or importation of such persons as the several States 
shall think proper to admit; nor shall such migration or 
importation be prohibited.”154 Randolph declared, in opposition 
to a clause whose substance he had himself drafted, 
He could never agree to the clause as it stands. He wd. sooner 
risk the constitution—. . . By agreeing to the clause, it would 
revolt the Quakers, the Methodists, and many others in the 
States having no slaves. On the other hand, two States might 
be lost to the Union.155 
As I have sought to emphasize, Edmund Randolph is hardly the 
Convention’s most consistent delegate. In taking this position, he 
aligned himself with the position taken by most of the Virginia 
delegates, and against the more radical delegates from the deep 
South—including, notably, John Rutledge, who spoke in favor.156 
These observations suggest that, whatever may be true for 
export taxes and navigation acts, the primary mover within the 
Committee on slavery was Rutledge. 
That observation raises a further question. Only Rutledge 
and Randolph came from states where slavery was a significant 
 
  151.  2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 452–53 (Aug. 29). 
 152.  Id. at 631 (Sept 15); cf. id. at 17–18 (July 16). 
 153. Id. at 374. 
 154. The clause is § VI. 4 of the Committee Report. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, id. at 
183 (Aug. 6). 
 155. Id. at 374. These remarks have sometimes been construed as a denunciation of 
slavery, but are more plausibly viewed as a call for a compromise between the positions 
of South Carolina and “the Quakers.” I note in passing that Mary Bilder has shown that 
Madison’s Notes for late August were written up after the Convention had ended: there 
is especial reason for treating them with caution. 
 156. Rutledge expressed his view to the Convention on August 22: 
If the Convention thinks that N.C; S.C.& Georgia will ever agree to the plan, 
unless their right to import slaves be untouched, the expectation is vain. The 
people of those States will never be such fools as to give up so important an 
interest. 
Id. at 373. 
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economic interest. So how did the “deep South” provisions 
secure a majority of votes on the five-member Committee? 
At this point it is necessary to clear away two widespread 
legends about Rutledge. One is the legend of a secret dinner 
meeting between Rutledge and Roger Sherman on June 30 at 
which they are said to have worked out the terms of an alliance 
between Connecticut and South Carolina.157 The second is the 
claim that Rutledge was a close friend of Wilson’s, and indeed 
that Rutledge lodged in Wilson’s house in the opening weeks of 
the Convention.158 Both claims have been frequently asserted in 
the scholarly literature. The second in particular has been used 
to support the thesis that Wilson and Rutledge worked together 
to “hijack” the Constitution. Both claims have their origin in 
what can only be termed a colorful 1942 biography of 
Rutledge.159 The author of the only other biography, published in 
1997, makes the unusual observation—unusual, at any rate, for 
an opening paragraph—that he found the earlier book so 
unreliable that he decided to ignore it altogether.160 I have been 
able to find no documentary support for either legend and 
suspect them to be fabrications. 
The story about the “secret dinner” does, however, contain 
a kernel of truth. There was certainly by the end of the 
Convention an alliance between the states of the deep South and 
the states of New England: and Connecticut and South Carolina 
were in the thick of it. By late August, when the delegates from 
Connecticut were vigorously defending the South Carolina 
position on slavery, it was clear to everybody at the Convention 
that a back-room bargain had been struck.161 The issue arose into 
public view on August 21. Of particular interest are a set of 
 
 157. The longest discussion of the June 30 meeting and its significance is in FORREST 
MCDONALD, E PLURIBUS UNUM: THE FORMATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC, 
1776–1790, at 176–78 (1965). 
 158. Wilson’s chief biographer, Charles Page Smith, repeats this claim. CHARLES 
PAGE SMITH, JAMES WILSON: FOUNDING FATHER, 1742–1798, at 203 (1956) (charac-
terizing Rutledge as an “intimate friend” of Wilson’s). STEWART, supra note 45, at 165 
and BEEMAN, supra note 5, at 269 n. 22, both follow his account. So, too, unfortunately, 
does Ewald, supra note 42, at 984. 
 159. RICHARD BARRY, MR. RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA (1942). 
 160. JAMES HAW, JOHN AND EDWARD RUTLEDGE OF SOUTH CAROLINA vii (1997) 
(“The only previous biography of John Rutledge, Richard Barry’s Mr. Rutledge of South 
Carolina . . ., is unreliable. I have followed the advice of Professor George C. Rogers, Jr., 
to ignore Barry’s book in writing this biography.”). 
 161. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 370–73 (Aug. 22). That there was a 
deal is even clearer from the debates of August 28. Madison explicitly notes the fact of 
the deal in his footnote to the proceedings of August 29. Id. at 449. 
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remarks by two members of the Committee of Detail discussing 
the importation of slaves: 
Mr. Rutlidge did not see how the importation of slaves could 
be encouraged by this section . . . Religion & humanity had 
nothing to do with this question—Interest alone is the 
governing principle with Nations . . . If the Northern States 
consult their interest, they will not oppose the increase of 
Slaves which will increase the commodities of which they will 
become the carriers. 
Mr. Elseworth was for leaving the clause as it stands. [L]et 
every state import what it pleases. The morality or wisdom of 
slavery are considerations belonging to the States them-
selves—What enriches a part enriches the whole, and the 
States are the best judges of their particular interest.162 
The exact terms of the quid pro quo are uncertain: but that there 
was a deal is not.163 The fact that Rutledge on the Committee of 
Detail was able to secure three votes for the “deep South” 
position strongly suggests that a bargain was already in place by 
the end of July. If that is so, he could count on both Ellsworth of 
Connecticut and Randolph of Virginia to support the position of 
South Carolina. 
When we gather together these various pieces of 
information we arrive at the following broad picture. Randolph 
was passionate about navigation acts, about restraining the 
powers of the central government and of the “monarchical” 
presidency; he was also open to cooperation with Rutledge on 
the issue of slavery. Rutledge was a zealous defender of slavery 
and navigation acts; and he had moreover likely already reached 
an understanding on these matters with the Connecticut 
delegation, here represented by Ellsworth. He was also a 
supporter of enumerated federal powers.164 Ellsworth, too, 
supported enumerated powers165 and the right of the Southern 
 
 162. Id. at 364. 
 163. Madison’s footnote, id. at 364, 369, 414–15, asserts that the deal concerned 
slavery and navigation. MCDONALD, supra note 157, at 179–80, criticizes the idea that a 
supermajority requirement for navigation acts was in the interest of the New England 
states and argues instead that Connecticut’s western land claims were involved. But why 
other New England states would have entered into an agreement to benefit Connecticut 
he leaves unexplained. Another possibility (suggested by the remarks of Ellsworth and 
Rutledge) seems to me more likely: that the New England states feared the loss of 
shipping revenue if South Carolina and Georgia were to leave the Union. 
 164. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53 (May 31); 2 CONVENTION 
RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (July 16). 
 165. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53–54 (May 31). 
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states to set their own position on slavery. He, in turn, was 
especially passionate about the rights of small states. He put the 
point in an eloquent speech on June 30: 
Under a National Govt. he should participate in the National 
Security . . . but that was all. What he wanted was domestic 
happiness. The Natl. Govt. could not descend to the local 
objects on which this depended. It could only embrace objects 
of a general nature. He turned his eyes therefore for the 
preservation of his rights to the State Govts. From these alone 
he could derive the greatest happiness he expects in this life. 
His happiness depends on their existence, as much as a new-
born infant on its mother for nourishment.166 
It seems likely, therefore, on the balance of the evidence, 
that Randolph, Rutledge, and Ellsworth provided three solid 
votes for a group of interlocking issues: enumerating congres-
sional powers, restraining the national government, limiting the 
powers of the presidency, requiring a supermajority for naviga-
tion acts, protecting slavery, protecting exports, and defending 
the powers of the state governments. 
If this analysis of the situation is correct, then Wilson faced 
the following predicament. On the one hand, he was by signifi-
cant distance the most powerful intellect on the Committee—so 
much so that many historians have simply assumed that he must 
have dominated the proceedings. On the other hand, on the 
issues we are considering, he almost certainly found himself 
outvoted by those three delegates. 
What of the final member of the Committee, Nathaniel 
Gorham? Unlike the others, Gorham was not a lawyer and so 
would have been in any case a weak ally for Wilson. In the 
Convention itself he spoke only sporadically and relatively 
briefly and appears not to have expressed himself on many of 
the most fundamental issues. But he, too, explicitly favored an 
enumeration of powers167; and he too, although he represented 
Massachusetts, was sympathetic to small government (and 
indeed several times suggested that the larger states be split 
up).168 When the time came for the debate in August about 
 
 166. Id., at 492 (June 30). The last sentence was inserted by Madison from the notes 
of Yates. 
 167. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (July 16). 
 168. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 540 (July 6); see id. at 462 
(recounting Gorham’s speech in which he supports small government) (June 29); see also 
2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 94 (citing Gorham’s argument that some of 
the large states would presumably be split into smaller states). It should be remembered 
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navigation acts and slavery, Gorham took an intermediate 
position. He spoke on August 22 against a supermajority 
requirement for navigation acts;169 but his comments came at the 
beginning of the debate and could have been a feint. Three days 
later, on August 25, came the revealing vote to extend the 
protection of the slave trade from 1800 to 1808. The vote pitted 
the states of New England and the deep South against the 
middle states. Pennsylvania and Virginia voted against the 
proposal.170 The motion emanated from South Carolina: and it 
was seconded by Gorham. Gorham thus emerges as a supporter 
of the alliance between New England and South Carolina. If that 
was his position three weeks earlier, then Wilson, far from 
dominating the Committee, would have been, on the most 
contentious issues, outvoted by a margin of four-to-one. 
How, then, should he respond? On the one hand, to have 
dissented openly from the final Committee report would have 
risked re-opening the antagonisms of the preceding weeks and 
possibly undermined the ability of the Convention to reach 
agreement on a Constitution.171 On the other hand, he did not 
have the votes in Committee to reverse Rutledge’s innovations. 
But such a shrewd strategist must also have seen that several of 
those innovations could most likely be overturned in 
Convention. So he apparently decided to bide his time. In the 
meantime, he would concentrate his efforts on mitigating the 
effects of the Committee innovations. If that was his strategy, it 
was a good one. In the closing Act III of the Convention he 
systematically argued against and defeated the objectionable 
portions of the Committee Report.172 We do not know exactly 
what negotiations occurred between Wilson and the others, or 
 
that states such as Massachusetts and Virginia were in fact broken into smaller pieces, 
yielding the states of Maine and Kentucky. 
 169. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 374 (“He desired it to be 
remembered that the Eastern States had no motive to Union but a commercial one. They 
were able to protect themselves. They were not afraid of external danger, and did not 
need the aid of the Southn. States.”). 
 170. Id. at 415–16 (Aug. 25). 
 171. I note in passing that, in the final days of the Convention, the delegates faced 
great pressure, despite their individual reservations about the Constitution, to give it 
their public support. There was great effort to try to achieve the appearance of 
unanimity, and the few non-signers afterwards seem to have been regarded by their 
fellow delegates as having in a certain measure betrayed the Convention. These 
pressures for unanimity were greater in the eighteenth century than they are today; and 
they would have been felt by the members of the Committee of Detail as well as within 
the Convention as a whole. 
 172. This topic lies beyond the scope of this paper. For a summary, see Ewald, supra 
note 42, at 993–1003.  
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whether Wilson threatened to withhold his assent. (As 
Madison’s Notes make clear, he was certainly capable of playing 
the bully, and of making threats “in terrorem” against other 
members.173) Whatever the internal dynamics, the next 
document, Farrand’s “Document IX,” contains several subtle 
additions which cumulatively swing the balance back in the 
direction of a strong national government. 
F. DRAFT IX 
Draft IX is the longest of the Wilson drafts—twenty-two 
pages of writing in six of his folded folio signatures. The draft 
begins with Wilson’s “We the People of the States,” taken from 
Document V. This draft, like the Randolph draft, contains 
marginalia in the hand of John Rutledge. Some of the Rutledge 
alterations are merely stylistic, but many involve matters of 
substance. For that reason, it seems most likely that these 
changes were introduced at a Committee meeting, with Rutledge 
in the chair.174 The draft retains the problematic provisions from 
earlier drafts: our concern is now with the new items. The most 
important involve the executive and, above all, the system of 
federal-state relations. 
 1. The Federalism Clauses 
As we saw, it was not the Convention as a whole, but the 
Committee of Detail that formulated the textual provisions that 
lie at the heart of American federalism: the enumeration of 
federal powers, the Necessary and Proper Clause, the restric-
tions on the powers of the states, and the supremacy clause. 
Each of these provisions has a complex intellectual history, both 
before and after the Convention. It is in Document IX that they 
for the first time coalesce with the Draft IV provisions on federal 
courts to form a recognizable system of federal-state relations; 
 
 173. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 123, n.* (June 5). 
 174.  There are some subtle matters that raise questions about the process of 
drafting. Wilson originally provided (in conformity with draft VI/VIII) that the 
qualifications of the electors of the legislature were to be prescribed by the legislatures of 
the states, subject to a congressional override. He deleted this passage; his replacement 
provides that the qualifications in each state are to be the same as those for the most 
numerous branch of the state legislature, and (I presume reluctantly) drops the override 
provision. There is a check mark beside the change, apparently by Wilson. Wilson later 
explained to the Convention that this provision had been carefully considered by the 
Committee, which suggests that he, too, and not just Rutledge, at times marked up the 
drafts during the Committee discussions. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 201 
(Aug. 7). 
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and in this document they reach their near-final form. The next 
several weeks were to add refinements, but the core remained 
remarkably unchanged. It is not my purpose here to discuss the 
broader intellectual history. The task is rather to focus on the 
work of the Committee itself—to try to understand (as far as the 
documents permit) how these provisions were assembled, by 
whom, and with what intent. 
  a. Overview: “Resolution VI” 
I begin with some preliminary points. 
Let us begin by considering more closely the powers 
assigned by the Convention to the national government. Broadly 
speaking, the delegates had a choice between several models. 
The first was the model of the Articles of Confederation. 
Here three ingredients are central. First, the Articles provide in 
Article II that “Each state retains its sovereignty . . . and every 
Power . . . which is not by this confederation expressly dele-
gated” to Congress. Article IX then enumerates the powers of 
the Confederation Congress. (This enumeration, as we saw, 
provided most of the items for Randolph’s enumeration in Draft 
IV.) Finally, in what might be called a “quasi-supremacy” clause, 
Article XIII provides that “Every State shall abide by the 
determination of [Congress], on all questions which by this 
confederation are submitted to them. And the Articles of this 
confederation shall be inviolably observed by every State . . . .” 
The state constitutions, in contrast, followed a variety of 
patterns. Many contained no explicit grant of legislative power at 
all: for instance, George Mason’s Virginia Constitution of 1776 
provides that “[t]he legislative, executive, and judiciary 
department, shall be separate and distinct, so that neither 
exercise the powers properly belonging to the other.” But Mason 
leaves any further specification of those powers entirely tacit.175 
Other constitutions contained an enumeration supplemented by 
a general grant of legislative authority. The Pennsylvania 
Constitution of 1776 is an example. It lists a number of explicit 
legislative powers, then concludes with a broad “necessity 
clause,” stating that the legislature “shall have all other powers 
necessary for the legislature of a free state or commonwealth: 
But they shall have no power to add to, alter, abolish, or infringe 
 
 175. 7 THORPE, supra note 67, at 3815; MASON PAPERS, supra note 62. 
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any part of this constitution.”176 The formulation in the 
Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 is extremely convoluted. It 
lists some legislative powers; then grants the broad general 
authority to make “all manner of wholesome and reasonable 
orders, laws, statutes, and ordinances, directions and 
instructions, either with penalties or without; so as the same be 
not repugnant or contrary to this constitution, as they shall judge 
to be for the good and welfare of this commonwealth . . . .”177—
and then, in a continuation to the same long sentence, goes on to 
list various other explicit powers. These three state constitutions 
were well known to the members of the Convention, as of course 
were the Articles. 
At this point, we must consider the scholarly controversy 
concerning “Resolution VI.” It is sometimes said—historically, it 
is the dominant view—that the Convention as a whole 
considered a broad grant of power, stated in Resolution VI of 
the Virginia Plan, but ultimately rejected this language in favor 
of an explicit enumeration. Hueston goes further, arguing that 
the Convention itself actually adopted a broad grant, but that 
the states’ rights advocates on the Committee of Detail 
circumvented its instructions, thereby “altering the course of the 
Convention.”178 More recently a group of constitutional scholars, 
also noticing that the Convention explicitly adopted a variant of 
Resolution VI and included it in the Convention resolutions, 
sees the work of the Committee not as a subversion of 
Resolution VI, but as an attempt to carry it into effect.179 The 
point is stated by Jack Balkin. Resolution VI, he says, 
was the animating purpose of the list of enumerated powers 
that appeared in the final draft, and it was the key explanation 
that framer James Wilson offered to the public when he 
defended the proposed Constitution at the Pennsylvania 
ratifying convention. . . . As Wilson explained, the purpose of 
enumeration was not to displace the principle, but to enact 
it[.]180 
 
 176. 5 THORPE, supra note 67, at 3085. 
 177. 3 THORPE, supra note 67, at 1894. 
 178. Hueston, supra note 36, at 767, 770. 
 179. Kurt Lash provides a list of “Resolution VI” scholars, including Akhil Amar, 
Jack Balkin, Robert Cooter, Andrew Koppelman, and Neil Siegel; he also documents the 
increasing use of Resolution VI in briefs filed before the Supreme Court. Kurt T. Lash, 
‘Resolution VI’: National Authority to Resolve Collective Action Problems Under Article 
I, Section 8, ILLINOIS PUBLIC LAW AND LEGAL THEORY RESEARCH PAPERS SERIES 
NO. 10–40 2 (Jan. 2012).  
 180. JACK BALKIN, LIVING ORIGINALISM 145 (2011); this quotation forms part of a 
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In other words, we can distinguish three models for the 
enumeration: 
(i) an express enumeration of powers (as in the Articles), with 
a presumption that any power not thus “expressly delegated” 
is retained by the states; 
(ii) an explicit enumeration of powers, but with the powers 
themselves being broadly construed under a necessity clause; 
on this view, Resolution VI served in the debates as a 
placeholder, but was fully discharged when the final 
enumeration and necessity clause was adopted; or, 
(iii) an illustrative enumeration of powers, with the powers 
not exhausting the grant, but being supplemented by the 
principle of Resolution VI.181 On this view, the enumeration 
serves as a kind of placeholder for Resolution VI, whose 
underlying principle remains operative. 
The work of the Committee is central to this issue, and the 
role of Wilson is likely to have been pivotal. Hamilton excepted, 
he was probably the most ardent nationalist at the Convention. 
And he stands in a particularly close relationship to Resolution 
VI. 
At this point we need to take account of an extremely 
perceptive observation about Wilson recently made by John 
Mikhail.182 Wilson came to the Convention with considerable 
experience as a constitutional litigator. In particular, he had 
thought deeply about the constitutionality of the establishment 
of a national bank under the Articles of Confederation. This 
much is well known; but Mikhail’s important observation is that 
the specific language of Resolution VI likely comes, not (as had 
previously been assumed) from Madison’s pre-Convention 
writings but from Wilson’s Considerations on the Bank of North 
America, published in 1785.183 Mikhail’s argument, based both on 
linguistic similarities and on the absence of the relevant portions 
 
wider discussion of Resolution VI directed largely against the position of Randy Barnett. 
Id. at 143–49. Balkin’s historical argument has been severely criticized by Lash, supra 
note 179, passim. 
 181. The term “illustrative” I borrow from Calvin H. Johnson, The Dubious 
Enumerated Powers Doctrine, 22 CONST. COMMENT. 25 (2005).  
 182. John Mikhail, The Necessary and Proper Clauses, Part 2: Foregoing Powers v. 
All Other Powers, BALKINIZATION (Aug. 22, 2011), http://balkin.blogspot.com/2011/ 
08/necessary-and-proper-clauses-part-2.html. Mikhail, for good analytical reasons, breaks 
the Necessary and Proper Clause into three distinct clauses; this refinement is not 
necessary for the more limited analysis given here. 
 183. Reprinted in JAMES WILSON, COLLECTED WORKS OF JAMES WILSON 60 
(Kermit L. Hall & Mark David Hall eds., 2007). 
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of Resolution VI from Madison’s earlier writings, is persuasive, 
as is his conjecture that Wilson’s language was adopted into the 
Virginia Plan when the Pennsylvania and Virginia delegations 
met before the opening of the Convention. Mikhail’s wider 
argument about the Necessary and Proper Clause is subtle and 
important and cannot be explored here. But the importance of 
his observation to our present topic should be evident. At the 
very least, Mikhail has established that Wilson had publicly and 
conspicuously argued for a broad constitutional principle in 
language nearly identical to Resolution VI; and that fact is 
relevant to our understanding of the formulation of the 
Necessary and Proper Clause in Document IX. 
One final point. As we proceed, it is important not to treat 
the various federalism clauses in isolation from one another. 
They were intended to form a system; and (although full proof is 
impossible) it is reasonable to think of the new elements in Draft 
IX as a Wilsonian rejoinder to the earlier drafts. 
  b. Enumeration of Powers 
Let us start with enumeration of powers; as we saw, the 
Randolph enumeration made its first appearance in Draft IV. 
The issue of enumeration had arisen several times in the 
course of the Convention, and on those occasions members of 
the Committee of Detail expressed their views. Resolution VI of 
the Virginia Plan was introduced by Randolph on May 29. The 
relevant portion stipulated: 
that the National Legislature ought to be impowered to enjoy 
the Legislative Rights vested in Congress by the Confedera-
tion & moreover to legislate in all cases to which the separate 
States are incompetent, or in which the harmony of the 
United States may be interrupted by the exercise of individual 
Legislation.184 
When Resolution VI came up for discussion on May 31, 
Rutledge and Charles Pinckney “objected to the vagueness of 
the term incompetent, and said they could not well decide how to 
vote until they should see that an exact enumeration of the 
powers comprehended by this definition.” 185 (This is all Madison 
tells us; he does not distinguish the speech of Rutledge from that 
of Pinckney.) Pierce Butler then “repeated his fears that we 
 
 184. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 21. 
 185. Id. at 53 (May 31). 
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were running into an extreme in taking away the powers of the 
States, and called on Mr. Randolp[h] for the extent of his 
meaning.” 
Challenged thus vigorously, Randolph, who had introduced 
Resolution VI in the first place, gave his explanation of its 
meaning. The quotation is important, for it inevitably influenced 
the Convention’s understanding, not just of Resolution VI, but 
of the role it was to play in their own deliberations. 
Randolph explained that he “disclaimed any intention to 
give indefinite powers to the national Legislature.” Indeed, in 
characteristic fashion he declared his inflexibility, stating 
that he was entirely opposed to such an inroad on the State 
jurisdictions, and that he did not think any considerations 
whatever could ever change his determination. His opinion 
was fixed on this point.186 
There is no good reason to doubt his statement: after all, it was 
partly on this issue that he refused to sign the Constitution.187 
As for Madison on that day, his own Notes report: 
Mr. Madison said that he had brought with him into the 
Convention a strong bias in favor of an enumeration and 
definition of the powers necessary to be exercised by the 
national Legislature; but had also brought doubts concerning 
its practicability. His wishes remained unaltered; but his 
doubts had become stronger. What his opinion might 
ultimately be he could not yet tell.188 
According to the notes of Pierce, Madison admonished the 
Convention, saying “it was necessary to adopt some general 
principles on which we should act,—that we were wandering 
from one thing to another without seeming to be settled in any 
one principle.”189 Pierce also reports that, towards the end of the 
discussion, Randolph, Wilson, and Madison all expressed their 
doubts about the possibility of an enumeration.190 But Randolph 
(if Pierce records him correctly) adds an important qualifier: the 
enumeration, he said, was impossible “just at this time.” After 
these discussions, the Convention voted to adopt Resolution VI. 
 
 186.  Id. 
 187. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 489, 563–64. 
 188. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 53 (May 31). 
 189. Id. at 60. 
 190.  Id. The remark of Wilson’s is similar to those of Randolph and Madison: “Mr. 
Wilson observed that it would be impossible to enumerate the powers which the federal 
Legislature ought to have.” His remark is not recorded in Madison’s Notes. 
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Only Roger Sherman, generally considered the strongest 
defender of the powers of the states, is recorded as having voted 
against. 
The evidence here is far from conclusive. The Convention 
adopted Resolution VI of the Randolph Plan, but only after 
Randolph had forcefully stated his understanding of what it 
entailed. It might be that Wilson or Madison favored a broad 
grant of power, with no enumeration; but, if so, their position (at 
least as reported by Madison) is hardly expressed with the clarity 
of which they were capable. The evidence, such as it is, appears 
to me stronger that the Convention accepted Randolph’s 
emphatic declaration and regarded Resolution VI as a 
temporary placeholder, operative “just at this time,” with details 
to be filled in later. This is one of those many places where one 
would like to know more, but where the evidence runs out. 
It is worthwhile to notice that Madison, in a long and careful 
letter to John Tyler written many years later, discusses the 
relevant portion of Resolution VI, saying of the phrases about 
“state incompetence” and the “harmony of the United States”: 
It can not be supposed that these descriptive phrases were to 
be left in their indefinite extent to Legislative discretion. A 
selection & definition of the cases embraced by them was to 
be the task of the Convention. If there could be any doubt 
that this was intended, & so understood by the Convention, it 
would be removed by the course of proceedings on them as 
recorded, in its Journal.191 
One must of course treat subsequent recollections with caution; 
but Madison does appear to be accurately reporting the 
understanding of the Convention. 
On July 7, in the middle of the “great debate,” the issue of 
enumeration briefly resurfaced. Elbridge Gerry suggested that 
the Convention now attempt an enumeration. Madison replied 
that such an enumeration could not yet be made—not at this 
stage in the proceedings, before the issue of representation in 
the second branch of the legislature had been settled.192 He did 
not reject the idea of an enumeration as such. 
 
 191. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 526–27. (Letter of Madison to John 
Tyler, internally dated to 1833, and probably never sent.) 
 192. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 551 (“Mr. Madison, observed that it 
wd. be impossible to say what powers could be safely & properly vested in the Govt. 
before it was known, in what manner the States were to be represented in it.”). 
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There matters rested throughout the rest of the great 
debate. On July 16, immediately after the vote on the 
“Connecticut Compromise,” the issue arose again. Madison, who 
had just suffered a crushing defeat, was no doubt distracted, and 
his Notes for that day are terse. The Convention was again asked 
to consider Resolution VI: 
Mr. Butler calls for some explanation of the extent of this 
power; particularly of the word incompetent. The vagueness of 
the terms rendered it impossible for any precise judgment to 
be formed. 
Mr. Ghorum [sic]. The vagueness of the terms constitutes the 
propriety of them. We are now establishing general principles, 
to be extended hereafter into details which will be precise & 
explicit. 
Gorham’s remark here as recorded by Madison is not entirely 
transparent; but he, like Randolph and the rest of the 
Convention, appears to have expected and favored an 
enumeration at some later point in the proceedings. His remarks 
were immediately followed by Rutledge: 
Mr. Rutlidge, urged the objection started by Mr. Butler and 
moved that the clause should be committed to the end that a 
specification of the powers comprised in the general terms, 
might be reported.193 
Immediately after this exchange, Randolph, himself still 
smarting from the vote on the “Connecticut Compromise,” 
asked that the Convention be adjourned.194 
The next day, Roger Sherman, who in the debate of May 31 
had been the only delegate to vote against Resolution VI, now 
suggested the Convention adopt a different formula. Madison’s 
Notes are still somewhat sketchy and the portions in brackets he 
later filled in from the (itself not always reliable) official Journal: 
Mr. Sherman observed that it would be difficult to draw the 
line between the powers of the Genl. Legislatures, and those 
to be left to the States; that he did not like the definition 
contained in the Resolution, and proposed in place of the 
words ‘of individual legislation’ line 4 inclusive, to insert, ‘to 
make laws binding on the people of the <United> States in all 
cases <which may concern the common interests of the 
 
 193. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 17 (July 16). 
 194. Id. at 18; challenged, he quickly explained that he meant an adjournment only 
for the day and not permanently. See also supra note 72 and accompanying text (noting 
Randolph’s foul mood after his own ideas of compromise were rejected). 
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Union>; but not to interfere with <the Government of the 
individual States in any matters of internal police which 
respect the Govt. of such States only, and wherein the 
General> welfare of the U. States is not concerned.’195 
The passage must be read with care. If Madison’s account is 
accurate, Sherman’s motion would have eliminated only the tail 
end of Resolution VI (which, recall, read: “to legislate in all 
cases to which the separate States are incompetent, or in which 
the harmony of the United States may be interrupted by the 
exercise of individual Legislation.”). It is not altogether clear 
what is being proposed, or what phrases would be replaced by 
what. Sherman clearly wishes to protect the “internal police” of 
the States from federal interference. The notes of John Lansing 
for that day observe that “Mr. Sherman in the course of his 
Remarks observed that the general Government could only have 
the Regulation of Trade and some other matters of general 
Concern and not to all the Affairs of the Union.196 The 
scholarship on Resolution VI generally treats Sherman as the 
great, stubborn defender of the powers of the States and Wilson 
as the great nationalist, favorable to a broad grant of power. In 
addition, these two delegates had, until the day before, been 
locked in bitter dispute. But now Madison tells us that “Mr. 
Wilson 2ded the [Sherman] amendment as better expressing the 
general principle.”197 The entire passage is perplexing, and one 
suspects that something important has been left out. 
But the discussions continued. When it became clear (in 
response to the prodding questions of Gouverneur Morris) that 
Sherman’s proposal would not allow for direct taxation, it was 
voted down by the Convention, 2–8. (Wilson’s vote is not 
separately recorded, but the Pennsylvania delegation voted with 
the majority.) 
Gunning Bedford then moved to alter the language of 
Resolution VI as follows, inserting the language in italics: 
to legislate in all Cases for the general Interests of the Union, 
and also in those to which the States are separately 
incompetent, or in which the Harmony of the United States 
may be interrupted by the Exercise of individual Legislation. 
A worried Randolph remarked: “This is a formidable idea 
indeed. It involves the power of violating all the laws and 
 
 195. Id. at 25 (July 17). 
 196. SUPPLEMENT, supra note 2, at 56 (June 6). 
 197. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26 (July 17). 
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constitutions of the States, and of intermeddling with their 
police.” After Bedford provided assurances that the new 
language was no more “extensive or formidable” than 
Randolph’s original proposal, the Bedford amendment was 
adopted by the Convention, 8–2.198 It was Bedford’s version of 
Resolution VI (with slight stylistic modifications) that made its 
way to the Committee of Detail. 
These various passages are too brief for us always to draw 
firm conclusions about the intent of the delegates; but the 
following points seem likely. First, the Convention as a whole 
pretty clearly rejected the “expressly delegated” language of the 
Articles: so far as can be seen without dissent. In the Virginia 
ratification debates, Randolph argued that the language had 
been “destructive” to the Union: even the passport system had 
been difficult to justify.199 Secondly, most delegates appear to 
have believed (Randolph, Rutledge, Gorham definitely, and 
probably both Madison and Wilson) that the vague grant of the 
Virginia Plan would eventually have to be replaced with a more 
specific enumeration. Thirdly, although some delegates (notably 
Madison and Wilson) may have hoped as well for a general grant 
of legislative power, they appear not to have argued for such an 
outcome—perhaps because they were still working for the 
adoption of Madison’s national veto, which would have 
accomplished some of the same ends. And finally, if the entire 
Convention had intended a broad, general grant of national 
power, and if an enumeration had been seen as incompatible 
with such a grant, then one would have expected the 
Committee’s Report to be met with protests. But there were no 
such protests. If the Notes are correct, when the Committee 
Report was presented, the idea of an enumeration was accepted 
without a murmur. These facts may all be granted; but they still 
leave open the question of whether the enumeration was 
understood by the Convention to be exhaustive or illustrative. 
Randolph’s enumeration in Draft IV needs to be seen in 
light of this entire history. He had always favored an explicit 
listing of the national legislative powers. There is no reason to 
suspect him of acting ultra vires or of attempting to deceive the 
Convention. After all, the Articles of Confederation contained 
an enumeration, and the Convention had explicitly resolved, as 
part of Resolution VI itself, “That the Legislature of the United 
 
 198. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 26–27 (July 17). 
 199. See Johnson, supra note 181, at 39–42. 
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States ought to possess the legislative Rights vested in Congress 
by the Confederation . . . .”200 As we have already seen, the 
enumeration in the Articles was the principal source for 
Randolph’s enumeration.201 The Convention had also, in the 
Bedford resolution, charged the Committee to add additional 
powers in areas where the states were “incompetent.” Here, too, 
Randolph complied with instructions, explicitly adding the 
powers to tax and to regulate commerce. Neither power was in 
the least controversial: even Roger Sherman supported both, as 
did the New Jersey Plan. If Randolph departed from 
expectations, he did so in the direction of minimalism. His 
enumeration granted to the national government virtually the 
shortest list of powers compatible with the instructions of the 
Convention.202 
  c. Necessary and Proper 
We now need to ask: What did Wilson think of all this? 
What was his attitude towards the enumeration in the Randolph 
Draft? I take it to be clear that he accepted the principles 
embodied in Resolution VI, before, during, and after the 
Convention, and agree with Mikhail that he either inspired the 
language or wrote it. But to accept the principle of Resolution 
VI is not necessarily to think that Resolution VI would serve as 
good constitutional text. Randolph Madison, and Gorham 
accepted the principle while explicitly declaring it to be a 
placeholder for something more precise: Madison in 1833 treats 
the point as obvious. Was Wilson’s attitude different? Perhaps; 
but I see no clear evidence that it was. True, he expressed doubt 
about the feasibility of an enumeration: but so did Randolph and 
Madison. He was not shy about voicing contrary opinions; yet he 
never—so far as Madison’s Notes reveal—objected to 
enumeration on principle. There is no sign that he recoiled from 
Randolph’s list, or that he pressed for additional powers to be 
included. Moreover, even in his earliest writings on 
parliamentary sovereignty, and subsequently in his opposition to 
the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, he repeatedly warned 
 
 200. See supra note 184 and accompanying text. 
 201. See supra notes 87–89 and accompanying text. 
 202. Similarly for his drafting of the provisions concerning the federal courts. The 
Convention language had said that the courts were to have jurisdiction over “such other 
Questions as involve the national Peace and Harmony”; Randolph took this vague 
formulation and made it precise. It is unlikely that he saw his enumeration any 
differently. 
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that legislatures could be as tyrannical as Kings: a caution 
against thinking he would have favored writing the text of 
Resolution VI into the Constitution. 
Against this interpretation might be mentioned the 
Pennsylvania Constitution of 1790, of which he was the leading 
drafter. In his Lectures on Law from 1792 he noted that the 
American Constitution contains no broad grant of powers, 
whereas the Constitution of Pennsylvania vested the general 
assembly “with every power necessary for a branch of the 
legislature of a free state.”203 Of this contrast, Wilson says only, 
“The reason is plain. The latter institutes a legislature with 
general, the former, with enumerated, powers.”  
And then there is the curious matter of Wilson’s 
endorsement of Sherman’s motion as “better expressing the 
sense” of Resolution VI. Wilson’s remark is perhaps not as 
surprising as it first appears. Sherman proposed little more than 
that matters affecting the union should be handled at the 
national level, whereas matters affecting solely the states should 
be handled by the states. So long as it was understood that this 
formula, too, was a placeholder, and that the all-important 
details remained to be specified, there was no reason for Wilson 
not to endorse the motion. 
In other words, I see no ground to think that Wilson would 
have seen Randolph’s enumeration as illegitimate. But still, 
there was a problem. The balance between state and federal 
power needed to be calibrated correctly, and the provisions so 
far adopted by the Committee would almost certainly have 
struck Wilson as tilting things too much toward the states. This 
brings us to the necessary and proper clause, which I take to be 
his response. 
The Randolph draft (Document IV) contains numerous 
provisions in the handwriting of Rutledge. Presumably, these 
were made during the course of a Committee meeting, with 
Rutledge presiding. He inserted into the enumeration a clause 
prohibiting the states from emitting paper bills of credit, and 
then, quickly scrawled across the top of the next page, “That 
Trials for Criml. Offenses be in the State where the Offe was 
comd—by Jury—And a right to make all Laws necessary to carry 
the foregoing Powers into Execu –.”204 This scribble is the first 
 
 203. WILSON, supra note 183, at 870. Wilson misquotes slightly; for the actual text, 
see THORPE, supra note 67, at 3094. 
 204. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
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version of what was to evolve into the Necessary and Proper 
Clause. 
It is not possible to say which Committee member or 
members instigated the inclusion of such a clause; but we can 
make a guess. Randolph can almost certainly be ruled out. On 
September 10 he listed as one of his principal reasons for not 
signing the Constitution “the general clause concerning neces-
sary and proper laws.”205 The formulation of the clause in Draft 
IV is weaker than the final version in Draft IX,206 and might not 
have been as objectionable to Randolph; still, it is hard to 
imagine that he instigated even the weaker version. Rutledge 
was almost as skeptical about unrestricted national power as 
Randolph: he, too, is an unlikely candidate. Ellsworth, who 
appears never to have spoken on this issue, is something of a 
cipher; and Gorham is not enough of a lawyer. 
The likeliest candidate is therefore Wilson. Of the 
Committee members, he is the one most sympathetic to national 
power. Moreover, in Document V—his brief initial sketch, likely 
written before the Committee first met—his outline indicates 
that he planned “To treat of the Powers of the legislative” and 
then “To except from those Powers certain specified Cases.” 
These remarks are elliptical: but it sounds as though he was 
thinking in terms of a more general grant of powers that would 
then be limited by specific restrictions. 
We do not know the precise form the necessity clause took 
in Draft VI/VIII—it would have been on the missing folio sheet. 
The original scrawled version in Document IV had spoken only 
of “a right to make all Laws necessary to carry the foregoing 
Powers into Execu –.” In Draft IX this idea appears in a 
significantly stronger form: “to make all Laws that shall be 
necessary and proper for carrying into full and complete 
Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested, by 
this Constitution, in the Government of the United States, or in 
any Department or Officer thereof.” The second cancelled 
expression was restored in the printed Committee Report, and 
(with some minor alterations to punctuation and capitalization) 
the entire clause made its way into the final text of the 
Constitution. The physical page here is almost a fair copy. The 
quoted passage seems to have been smoothly and fully written 
 
supra note 20, at 277. 
 205. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 563 (Sept. 10). 
 206. Mikhail rightly emphasizes this point; supra note 182. 
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out, without interlineations, before the deleted words were 
crossed out. (I presume, on a matter of this importance, that 
Wilson did not first write the cancelled phrase, then continue 
with the rest as an afterthought. Incidentally, although the page 
contains some marginalia by Rutledge, the cancellations here 
appear to be Wilson’s.) That Wilson on this page tinkered with 
the formulation is perhaps another small hint of authorship.207 
At this point we must be careful not to attribute to Wilson 
and the members of the Committee greater foresight than in 
1787 they could have possessed. Wilson may perhaps have hoped 
that the Necessary and Proper Clause would open the door to an 
expansive view of national powers. He may perhaps have hoped 
that it would cause the enumeration to be understood to be 
illustrative rather than exhaustive. But there is no clear evidence 
that he analyzed matters in these terms. The surviving evidence 
even for Wilson—let alone for the Convention as a whole—is 
patchy and inconclusive. It should be remembered that the 
specific “necessary and proper” terminology was novel; the 
public understanding of the clause was unpredictable; 
McCulloch still lay far in the future; and, for all anybody could 
tell, the clause might have been construed narrowly. One thinks 
of the Privileges and Immunities Clauses, or the guarantee of 
republican government. That the interpretation of the clause was 
contested for so long, pitting constitutional thinkers of the 
stature of Jefferson and Madison against Hamilton and 
Marshall, is a warning that the mere act of drafting the language 
still left a great deal unsettled. To us, after more than two 
centuries of constitutional history, it is obvious that the strong 
version of the Necessary and Proper Clause is fundamental. But 
it might not have seemed that way at the time. I note in passing 
that Wilson’s chapter “Of the Legislative Department” in his 
Lectures scarcely mentions the clause. Almost as an after-
thought, he mentions only the narrow version of the clause, 
 
 207. I note in passing one further point. The famous interpretation of the Necessary 
and Proper Clause in Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. 
316 (1819), follows the analysis provided by Hamilton in his memorandum concerning 
the constitutionality of a national bank, submitted to Washington in February, 1791. The 
bank itself Hamilton had proposed in his Report on a National Bank, submitted to 
Congress in December, 1790. A full copy of that lengthy Report, in Hamilton’s 
handwriting, is among the Wilson papers at the Historical Society of Pennsylvania. It is 
suggestive that the argument about the constitutionality of the bank turned on the 
interpretation of the Necessary and Proper Clause, and that Hamilton, as a former 
member of the Convention, knew of the role Wilson had played; but the precise nature 
of their communications cannot be further reconstructed. For further details, see Ewald, 
supra note 42, at 908–10. 
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granting it two sentences in the penultimate paragraph and 
saying only that it was intended to insure that the enumerated 
powers not be “nugatory.”208 One has the impression that many 
other matters struck him as more important. 
  d. Supremacy 
With enumeration and the Necessary and Proper Clause 
behind us, the remaining federalism provisions can be handled 
more rapidly. 
The development of the Supremacy Clause took a strange 
trajectory. The Articles of Confederation contained in Article 
XIII what might be called a “quasi-supremacy clause,” declaring 
that the states were to abide by decisions of Congress, and were 
to observe the Articles themselves “inviolably.” But this 
somewhat overly-optimistic formulation left no scope for 
adjudication of difficult cases and no mechanism for 
enforcement. At bottom, the system depended on voluntary 
compliance by the states. The Virginia Plan had sought to deal 
with this issue by two devices: (i) a national veto by Congress 
over the state legislatures; and (ii) the power of the Congress to 
call forth the national military to force recalcitrant states into 
line. Madison appears to have drafted both provisions; but even 
he almost immediately expressed serious reservations about the 
second.209 Nevertheless, it appears to have been universally 
agreed that some sort of strengthening of the national powers 
was called for, and the New Jersey Plan (introduced in June 15) 
proposed the following language: 
Resd. that all Acts of the U. States in Congrs. made by virtue 
& in pursuance of the powers hereby & by the articles of 
confederation vested in them, and all Treaties made & 
ratified under the authority of the U. States shall be the 
supreme law of the respective States so far forth as those Acts 
or Treaties shall relate to the said States or their Citizens, and 
that the Judiciary of the several States shall be bound thereby 
in their decisions, any thing in the respective laws of the 
Individual States to the contrary notwithstanding . . . .210 
Curiously, the New Jersey Plan also provided for calling forth 
the power of the national military. In response, Randolph 
objected that the proper remedy was not military coercion, but a 
 
 208. WILSON, supra note 183, at 872. 
 209. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 54 (May 31). 
 210. Id. at 245 (June 15). 
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national government acting directly on individuals.211 After the 
rejection of the New Jersey Plan, the Convention returned to the 
Virginia Plan and for the next month was consumed by the 
“great debate” over proportional representation. A month later, 
the day after the “Connecticut Compromise,” the Convention 
voted to reject the Madison national veto. In its stead, Luther 
Martin moved to reinstate the language quoted above from the 
New Jersey Plan, language which (with a few inconsequential 
changes) was incorporated into the Convention resolutions 
forwarded to the Committee of Detail.212 The language appears 
in Wilson’s Draft IX, but with one major change: “any Thing in 
the Constitutions or Laws of the several States to the Contrary 
notwithstanding.”213 It is possible that Paterson and Martin had 
deliberately formulated the original language so as to permit the 
states to preserve their autonomy; but some Committee member 
with a sharp eye plugged the gap. As with the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, the likeliest suspect is Wilson. 
  e. Restrictions on the States 
The Convention resolutions had not contained a list of 
enumerated powers; nor did they contain a list of restrictions on 
the states. Just as the Randolph draft had looked to the Articles 
of Confederation for its list of enumerated powers, so Draft IX 
looks to the same source (Article VI) for a list of prohibitions on 
the states. This was the first version of what would eventually 
become Article I, §10. Most of these restrictions were taken 
more-or-less directly from the Articles, and did not provoke 
controversy when the Committee reported them back to the 
 
 211. Id. at 256 (June 16). 
 212. COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, at 245. In the Randolph draft, a 
Supremacy Clause appears in Rutledge’s hand,and reads as follows: “All laws of a 
particular state, repugnant hereto, shall be void, and in the decision thereon, which shall 
be vested in the supreme judiciary, all incidents without which the general principles 
cannot be satisfied shall be considered, as involved in the general principle.” 2 
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 144; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, supra note 20, 
at 277. This text was for some reason then struck out. I note the extraordinary 
awkwardness of the formulation, which is characteristic of Rutledge—and which 
provides at least a minor indication that Wilson was responsible for most of the actual 
drafting of the far more lucid Committee Report. 
 213. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 169. Wilson’s full version reads: 
The Acts of the Legislature of the United States made in Pursuance of this 
Constitution, and all Treaties made under the Authority of the United States 
shall be the supreme Law of the several States, and of their Citizens and 
Inhabitants; and the Judges in the several States shall be bound thereby in their 
Decisions, any Thing in the Constitutions or Laws of the several States to the 
Contrary notwithstanding. 
Id. 
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Convention.214 No doubt most delegates took it for granted that 
the prohibitions contained in the Articles would continue. The 
most significant change is the inclusion of a prohibition on 
coining money or issuing paper bills of credit. This was not 
controversial at the Convention, though it engendered debate in 
some of the state ratifying conventions. Wilson certainly favored 
such a restriction; but so did most of the other delegates, and the 
matter first appears in the Randolph draft, inserted in Rutledge’s 
handwriting. There is no reason to attribute this change to any 
Committee member in particular.215 
  f. Miscellaneous Federalism Provisions 
Draft IX also contains three further provisions relating to 
federalism. The first is in Wilson’s handwriting: a guarantee to 
each state of a republican form of government. This provision 
had been specified in the Convention resolutions, and Wilson 
simply adopted the language with minor changes. In the margin, 
in Rutledge’s handwriting, is a version of the privileges and 
immunities clause, and the notation, “Full Faith & Credit &c.”216 
Neither of these provisions had been formally discussed in the 
 
 214. The principal points taken from the Articles—sometimes with modifications to 
the language—are as follows: The states are prohibited from entering into treaties of 
alliance with foreign powers or other states; from imposing duties on imports; from 
keeping troops or ships in time of peace; from issuing letters of marque and reprisal; 
from engaging in war; and from granting titles of nobility. Id. 
 215. The Articles of Confederation had granted Congress the power (by a super-
majority of nine votes) to coin money and (by a simple majority) to regulate the alloy of 
coin struck by the states. The Articles did not prohibit the states from coining money nor 
from issuing paper currency. This was of course an issue of fundamental importance—
socially divisive and one of the principal reasons, much discussed by Beard and the 
progressive historians, for the calling of a Constitutional Convention. Already in 1786 
Madison was denouncing the “folly” of paper money, which was at the heart of his 
famous list of “Vices”. MADISON, Vices of the Political System of the United States, in 9 
MADISON PAPERS, supra note 56, at 349. See generally Mary M. Schweitzer, State-Issued 
Currency and the Ratification of the U.S. Constitution, 49 J. ECON. HIST. 311 (1989) 
(detailing the critical nature of the paper money supply within the United States at the 
time of ratification). The Randolph draft shows numerous insertions and deletions on 
this point, mostly in the hand of Rutledge, but in essence gave to Congress the exclusive 
right to coin money and prohibited the states from issuing paper money unless 
authorized by Congress. The idea was already contained in the Pinckney Plan, which the 
Committee had at its disposal; but there is no reason to think that Rutledge or Randolph 
could not have come up with the prohibitions for themselves. Draft IX essentially 
adopted the Randolph position, which made its way into the final Committee Report. 
Wilson himself would have gone further. When the proposal was debated in Convention 
on August 28, he favored making the prohibition on the issuance of paper money by the 
states absolute. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 439. 
 216. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 174; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 361. Farrand mistakenly does not record that the insertions are in 
Rutledge’s hand. 
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Convention; both were taken (via Charles Pinckney) from the 
Articles of Confederation. Both found their way into the 
Committee Report and thence into the Constitution. 
This has been a long analysis of the federalism provisions; 
let me pull together the main threads. It seems to me that behind 
the Committee documents we can discern a subtle tug-of-war, 
with the initial Randolph-Rutledge drafts favoring state power, 
and Draft IX taking a more Wilsonian position. I believe the 
strong Necessary and Proper Clause, the prohibitions on the 
states, and the formulation of the Supremacy Clause to be 
primarily Wilson’s handiwork. But full proof is impossible; and 
in any case the point should not be exaggerated. Wilson would 
have needed to secure at least two other committee votes; and as 
I argued, the differences between himself and Randolph (or 
even Roger Sherman) are hardly an unbridgeable chasm. 217 
 2. The Executive 
Let us briefly recall the treatment of the executive in the 
Randolph Draft. The Convention resolutions had stipulated as 
the powers of the executive only “the power to carry into 
Execution the national Laws,” the power to appoint officers “in 
cases not otherwise provided for,” and the veto power. 
Randolph, in keeping with his distrust of the executive as the 
 
 217. Let me here briefly indicate my position on the “Resolution VI” controversy, 
supra note 180 and accompanying text. It seems to me that there are some factual slips 
and omissions in Balkin’s account of Resolution VI, but that they do not vitiate his larger 
argument. He is correct that Resolution VI (as amended by Bedford) was settled upon as 
a statement of the general principle the Convention wished the Committee of Detail to 
discharge: even on the “placeholder” view, this is clearly true. It is equally true that 
Randolph and Wilson understood themselves to be carrying out the Convention’s 
instructions: Mikhail’s observation only strengthens the point. 
Everything now turns on what it means to “discharge” Resolution VI. Crudely put, 
there are two choices. (1) One might view Resolution VI as mere scaffolding, a 
temporary structure to be dismantled and discarded once the task is complete. On this 
view, once the enumeration of powers and the Necessary and Proper Clause have been 
adopted, Resolution VI has been discharged without residue and has no further role to 
perform. (There are of course areas of law where such a view is almost a precondition of 
sanity: one does not wish to argue every issue of tax law from first principles.)  
(2) On the other view, Resolution VI retains a residual use. Explicitly adopted by 
the Convention as a statement of what they intended the enumeration of powers to 
accomplish, it is now available, on originalist grounds, as an interpretive principle for 
understanding the powers listed in the enacted text. 
Historical facts about the Convention cannot settle this matter; indeed, although the 
delegates did not formulate the choice in this way, it is reasonably clear that Randolph 
would have inclined to the first view and Wilson to the second. My own view (which I 
shall not argue) is that the second view is the more defensible. But that is now a claim of 
legal philosophy, not of history; and to that extent the historical criticisms of Balkin 
misunderstand the argument.  
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“foetus of monarchy,” provided that the executive was to be 
elected by Congress and to be ineligible for a second term. The 
Convention to this time had not discussed the question of who 
was to control foreign affairs. Randolph’s original Draft IV 
assigned the principal powers (over treaties and appointment of 
ambassadors) to the Senate: the executive only had the right to 
receive ambassadors. Randolph indeed at one point had 
suggested that the Senate ought to be perpetually in session, 
“perhaps to aid the executive.”218 On his conception the chief 
executive was to be kept weak and many executive functions 
performed by the Senate. 
The Rutledge annotations (presumably reflecting the work 
of the Committee) considerably strengthen the list of powers, 
and it is likely that Wilson, the most vigorous advocate at the 
Convention for a strong presidency, was in the forefront of the 
changes. The executive is now the commander-in-chief of the 
state militias and of the national military; has his salary placed 
beyond legislative control; is given an enhanced appointment 
power; is authorized to make recommendations to Congress; and 
is given the power to pardon.219 None of these changes would 
have been congenial to Randolph. 
We do not possess the folio sheet for the executive in Draft 
VI/VIII. Our next glimpse is Draft IX; Wilson, working from this 
enhanced list (and relying at many points on the linguistic 
formulations in the Pinckney Plan) worked up a recognizable 
first version of what was to become Article II, Sect. 2 of the 
Constitution. In particular, he began with the words: “The 
Executive Power of the United States shall be vested in a single 
Person.” This “vesting clause” and the way in which Wilson 
formulated the articles, situated the powers of the presidency 
firmly in the hands of the chief executive and precluded the sort 
of legislative interference Randolph had contemplated.220 Wilson 
was not able in Committee to retrieve the foreign affairs powers 
that Randolph had assigned to the Senate; he no doubt decided 
to bide his time and to argue the matter in Convention. In any 
case, a presidency that had come to the Committee with little 
more than the veto power and the power to make appointments 
 
 218. 1 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 415 (June 25). 
 219. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 145–46; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 277–78. All the additions are in the hand of Rutledge. Originally the 
appointment power had read, “to appoint to offices not otherwise provided for”; 
Rutledge appended “by the constitution.” 
 220.  See THACH, supra note 52, at 102–03. 
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(subject to Congressional control), left with a much broader 
range of powers that had effectually been insulated from 
Congressional interference. It is difficult not to see Wilson as the 
principal architect of these provisions.221 
 3. The Judiciary 
As we saw earlier, Randolph’s draft introduced, in a 
recognizable form, much of the specification of the jurisdiction 
of the federal courts.222 In Rutledge’s handwriting on that draft 
(which likely reflects Committee deliberations) are only two 
substantive additions, giving the federal courts jurisdiction over 
admiralty cases, and over disputes “between a State & a Citizen 
or Citizens of another State.”223 Wilson could have proposed 
either of these additions and certainly would have approved 
both; but there is no particular reason to attribute them to him 
rather than to Randolph or Rutledge. For Draft IX’s treatment 
of the judiciary, Wilson essentially took the annotated Randolph 
Draft and polished the language; the boundary between original 
and appellate jurisdiction is specified with more precision and 
cases involving ambassadors are added to the list. But in 
substance, the draft adds little new. 
Wilson’s text of Document IX is essentially the draft of the 
Constitution presented by the Committee to the Convention on 
Monday, August 6. On August 5, some sixty copies were secretly 
printed by a local printer named John Dunlap for the use of the 
delegates.224 This printed text contained one significant further 
addition: the first version of the Treason Clause. Because 
treason had been a special concern of Wilson’s since his 
unsuccessful defense of accused loyalists and Quakers during the 
war, this clause, too, is likely to reflect his handiwork.225 
 
 221. This is also the conclusion of Thach’s meticulous study. Wilson’s various 
interventions on the presidency during Act I and Act III of the Convention are discussed 
in detail in Ewald, supra note 42. 
 222.  See supra note 112 and accompanying text (defining the jurisdiction for the 
Judiciary). The original language of the Convention Resolutions on this jurisdictional 
point was extremely vague and read as follows: “Resolved[.] That the Jurisdiction of the 
national Judiciary shall extend to Cases arising under the Laws passed by the general 
Legislature, and to such other Questions as involve the national Peace and Harmony.” 2 
CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 132–33. 
 223.  2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 147; COMMITTEE DOCUMENTS, 
supra note 20, at 279. 
 224. Id. at 175. Numerous copies of this Report have survived; Wilson’s apparently 
exists, but is in private hands. 
 225. See James William Hurst, Treason in the United States: II. The Constitution, 58 
HARV. L. REV. 395, 404–06 (1945) (describing Wilson’s “particular interest” in the 
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III. CONCLUSIONS 
This has been a long analysis of the work of the Committee 
of Detail. Even so, it is far from complete. There remain two 
further documents in the Wilson archive; both relate to the plan 
submitted by Charles Pinckney at the start of the Convention. 
The story of these documents is complex, as is the analysis of 
their influence on the work of the Committee; so I shall defer a 
discussion of Pinckney to another occasion. There is also the 
question of the specific influence of the Committee Report on 
the Convention. The printed Report was distributed to the 
delegates and provided the framework for the debates in Act III: 
one wants to know how the Report was received and what 
happened to the controversial additions. (The Committee, 
incidentally, continued to meet during Act III; but we have no 
documentation of its internal activities.226) But these matters lie 
beyond the scope of this Article.  
Let me now pull together the main threads. We can divide 
the contributions of the Committee into three rough categories: 
(α) Bookkeeping Contributions. On many matters—indeed, 
on most matters—the Committee was simply writing up the 
explicit decisions of the Convention, or adding provisions from 
the Articles that everybody took for granted. (The Privileges and 
Immunities Clause and the Full Faith and Credit Clause fall into 
this category.) On these matters, it is safe to assume that the 
Committee was unanimous, and it would be idle to search for 
individual influences. (It is likely that Wilson incorporated into 
the Constitution many pieces of nomenclature taken from 
Charles Pinckney: but that is a point about terminology, not 
about substance.) 
(β) Controversial Insertions. These are the additions that 
had no basis in the prior work of the Convention and that were 
ultimately rejected in August. They include especially the “deep 
South” provisions on slavery, on navigation acts, and on taxation 
of exports, as well as the resolutions on such matters as the 
power of the states to set the salaries of their representatives in 
Congress. 
These provisions make their first appearance in the 
Randolph draft and are extremely important to the internal 
 
Treason Clause). 
 226. 2 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 321–22 (Aug. 18); 334–37 (Aug. 20); 
383 (Aug. 23). 
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history of the Convention. As is well known, they caused 
immense controversy for most of the month of August: 
historians have discussed the issue of slavery at length and have 
invariably (and doubtless correctly) detected the hand of 
Rutledge in the Committee’s recommendations. Within the 
Committee he must have had the support of Randolph and of at 
least one of the New Englanders. Here, Wilson, far from being 
the dominant member of the Committee, was certainly in the 
minority and possibly in a minority of one. 
Whether the enumeration of congressional powers should 
also be included in class (β) is, as we saw, a debatable point. On 
the one hand, the enumeration first appears in the Randolph 
draft and is of a piece with his anti-federal tendencies. On the 
other, the enumeration is grounded in the Articles and most 
members of the Convention appear to have expected such an 
enumeration to be included. Wilson might well have favored a 
broader and less trammeled grant of legislative power than did 
the other Committee members; but the surviving evidence leaves 
the specifics of his position open to speculation. In any case, that 
enumeration survived the rest of the summer in a way the other 
proposals in (β) did not. 
The initial Randolph draft, in addition to the controversial 
insertions, also reflects a powerful tendency to restrict the 
powers of the national government, to cabin the executive, and 
to enhance the powers of the states. Wilson is unlikely to have 
sympathized with any of this and especially with the treatment of 
the executive. If one carefully examines the sequence of drafts, 
from Randolph’s Draft IV to the Committee’s Draft IX, one 
sees a clear progression—not so much by a subtraction of the 
controversial early insertions as by the addition of provisions 
that bring the final Committee Report closer to the position of 
Wilson. How exactly this transformation was accomplished is 
impossible to say: presumably there was a tug-of-war, but the 
details cannot now be reconstructed. This brings me to the last 
category: 
(γ) Substantive Modifications. In this category fall all those 
provisions not specifically mandated by the Convention (and 
thus not in (α)), but not so controversial as to fall within (β). 
Most of these modifications made their way into the final draft 
of the Constitution, with remarkably little further debate. It is 
important to emphasize that little in this category was entirely 
without precedent. There are exceptions, but almost every clause 
of the Committee Report has antecedents either in the Articles, 
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or in the state Constitutions, or in one of the three plans—
Virginia, New Jersey, and Pinckney—that the Convention 
consigned to Committee. So here it was a matter, not of creating 
entirely from scratch, but of selecting, of choosing what to 
include from the mass of available materials, of filling in details, 
of formulating appropriate language, and of organizing the 
whole into a coherent text. 
It is in category (γ) that Wilson’s role is likely to have been 
the greatest. Randolph and Rutledge were clumsy draftsmen.227 
The fact that the Committee drafts are all in Wilson’s 
handwriting; his skill as a drafter of legislation; his attention to 
fine shades of language; the existence among his papers of his 
own careful transcriptions of the Pinckney and New Jersey plans, 
all point to his deep involvement in the process. And there is a 
further matter. Wilson lived in Philadelphia. His house, with his 
desk and papers, was just across Chestnut Street from the State 
House. It is hard to imagine that the other members of the 
Committee sat at his elbow, patiently watching him write the 
successive drafts in longhand. It is far more likely that he did this 
work by himself, at home, presenting the results to the 
Committee for discussion and comment. 
There is an instructive experiment that the reader can 
perform at this point. If one takes photocopies of the 
Convention resolutions, the state constitutions (especially of 
Massachusetts, New York, and Virginia), the texts of the New 
Jersey Plan and the Pinckney Plan, and the Articles of 
Confederation, and, with scissors, cuts them into individual 
clauses, spreads them out on the floor, and then rearranges them 
thematically, one quickly becomes aware of the vast range of 
possibilities: in these circumstances, the power to select, the 
power to organize, is also the power to create. And there is also 
the power to omit. We noticed, besides the positive 
contributions, also one conspicuous negative contribution of the 
Committee, most likely attributable to Randolph: the decision 
(connected, like so much else, to the issue of slavery) not to 
include a Bill of Rights. 
Somewhat surprisingly, Randolph turns out to be more 
important than has generally been recognized. Wilson and 
Rutledge are typically assumed to have been the principal actors; 
that is likely correct, but it is in fact extremely difficult to assign 
specific clauses confidently to either. Randolph, on the other 
 
 227. See supra note 115. 
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hand, seems to have produced the first draft of the Constitution 
by himself, working before the Committee first met. His draft 
contains several hobby-horses of his own and no hobby-horses of 
anybody else. As a result, certain novel provisions in that draft 
can plausibly be credited to him—notably the enumeration of 
powers and the specification of the jurisdiction of the federal 
courts. The former had precedent in the Articles; but the latter 
was new. Randolph was a considerable lawyer and later served 
as Attorney General: there is no reason to suppose him 
incapable of having drafted these provisions on his own. If so 
(and despite his failure to sign) he must be counted as one of the 
greatest contributors to the final document. 
What of Madison? What of the claim that “With Wilson on 
[the Committee], it mattered little that Madison was off”?228 If 
the suggestion is that Madison exercised control and that Wilson 
was simply carrying through his agenda, the claim is entirely 
lacking in evidence. In the first place, the provisions to which 
Wilson is most likely to have contributed have more to do with 
his own constitutional ideas than with Madison’s; and beyond 
that there is no sign that he ever regarded himself as acting in 
the service of anybody else. It is true that Madison subsequently 
endorsed much of the work of the Committee; and it is also true 
that, throughout the Convention, Madison and Wilson often 
found themselves in agreement. But beyond that, if there is any 
evidence of a direct and specifically Madisonian influence on the 
work of the Committee of Detail, I confess I have been unable 
to find it. Randolph’s concentration of powers in the Senate may 
owe something to him; but his most characteristic and distinctive 
ideas—the congressional veto, the Council of revision—are 
nowhere to be seen. 
What about Wilson himself? Wilson was deeply involved in 
the drafting process, and the Committee report undoubtedly 
bears many traces of his influence. It is incorrect, however, to 
exaggerate this point and to characterize the Committee as “a 
committee of Wilson and four others.” Randolph and Rutledge 
in particular were powerful countervailing influences—certainly 
in category (β), but no doubt in (γ) as well. What provisions 
show the marks of his handiwork? As we saw, it is impossible to 
link specific clauses to him with the same confidence that is 
possible for Randolph. But the likeliest candidates are: the 
opening words, “We the People of the States”; the strong version 
 
 228. BRANT, supra note 31. 
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of the Necessary and Proper Clause; the Treason Clause; the 
Supremacy Clause (with regard to state constitutions); and much 
of the detailed structure of the powers of the presidency. These 
are issues that had particular salience to Wilson, and to which he 
devoted considerable thought. They are not visible in the 
Randolph draft. More importantly, they would have been out of 
character for either Rutledge or Randolph, and they are too 
legally subtle for it to be likely that they emanated from 
Ellsworth or Gorham. There may be other provisions for which 
Wilson bears the primary responsibility, but those seem the most 
likely. 
But these ascriptions of responsibility are likelihoods rather 
than certainties. They cannot be established beyond all doubt; 
and in any case, each of the contributions of the Committee 
would have needed the assent of at least three committee 
members. 
That said, the following can be asserted with confidence. 
The Committee of Detail was not just an interlude in the history 
of the Convention and not just a matter of “tidying up.” That is 
true at most for the items in category (α); but manifestly false for 
(β) and (γ). For our purposes, the category to focus on is (γ). It 
was the Committee that worked out, in a recognizable form, the 
main elements of American federalism and wrote them into the 
Constitution: the enumeration of powers, the Necessary and 
Proper Clause, the Supremacy Clause, the prohibitions on the 
states, the specification of the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 
and certain aspects of the presidency. Those things had scarcely 
been discussed in the prior work of the Convention; they were 
added by the Committee, and they were to survive into the final 
document, for the most part with only slight modifications to the 
language. These elements are so fundamental to the 
Constitution that they entitle the Committee to be counted as 
“Act II” of a three-act Convention, fully comparable in 
importance to what went before and what came after. Indeed, 
Oliver Ellsworth is reported to have made this very point to his 
son in 1802: 
He, Judge E., told me one day as I was reading a Newspaper to 
him containing Eulogiums upon the late General Washington, 
which among other things ascribed to him the founding of the 
American Government to which Judge Ellsworth objected, 
saying President Washington’s influence while in the 
Convention was not very great, at least not much as to the 
forming of the present Constitution of the United States in 
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1787, which Judge Ellsworth said was drawn by himself and 
five others, viz.—General Alexander Hamilton, Gorham of 
Mass, deceased, James Wilson of Pennsylvania, Rutledge of 
South Carolina and Madison of Virginia.229 
Ellsworth’s memory may have been faulty, or his son may have 
misheard or misremembered his words; but his list is just the 
Committee of Five, with Hamilton substituted for Randolph, 
and the entirely justified inclusion of Madison among the 
principal framers. 
Beyond those observations, there are three broad morals to 
this story. The first is that the mere presence or absence of 
archival documents matters greatly to the way we conceive the 
origins of the Constitution: and the survival of the documents is 
in large measure a matter of happenstance. Secondly, the 
documentation concerning the Committee of Detail is more dry 
and technical than the dramatic story contained in Madison’s 
Notes; and that very fact (as well as the way in which the 
documents are reprinted by Farrand) has tended to deflect the 
historiography of the Convention away from the actual legal 
accomplishments—away, that is, from constitutional law—and 
towards the human-interest story of the events of the 
Convention itself. I take it to be clear that this is a misplaced 
emphasis. 
The third moral is perhaps the most important. In working 
with the Committee of Detail manuscripts, it is of great 
importance not to let interpretation run ahead of the evidence. 
In particular, it is important not to ascribe to the Committee 
members an understanding of their task that nobody would have 
had in 1787. Many matters of central constitutional importance 
were not worked out until years later; and although the members 
of the Convention were unquestionably farsighted, they were 
not clairvoyants. The implications even of some of their most 
fundamental decisions could not at the time have been foreseen. 
In analyzing the work of the Committee of Detail I have 
tried to establish what can be known about its contributions to 
the Constitution: but it is equally important to take note of what 
cannot be known. It is natural to wonder, for instance, what the 
members of the Committee, when they drafted the Necessary 
and Proper Clause, thought its precise relationship was to the 
enumeration of powers; and it is disappointing to find that the 
 
 229. 3 CONVENTION RECORDS, supra note 2, at 396–97.  
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evidence does not supply an unambiguous answer. But there is 
no way to tell. At bottom, the only evidence we have for 
reconstructing the original intent of the Framers is a few old 
scraps of paper. If one undertakes some painstaking archival and 
textual work, there are indeed many important things to say 
about their intentions. But the documentary sources are 
problematic; they are incomplete; they undoubtedly contain 
distortions and hidden agendas; and there is absolutely no 
reason to suppose that they are able to answer any anachronistic 
question that lawyers are capable of asking. At some point, the 
evidence simply runs out. 
 
